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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new class of infinite population games, which we term graphon
games. As a first contribution, we show that graphon games can be used to describe strategic
behavior in heterogeneous populations of infinite size. We establish existence and uniqueness of
graphon equilibria and derive general comparative statics results. As a second contribution, we
study the equilibria of an ensemble of finite network games sampled from a stochastic network
formation process (represented by the graphon). We provide explicit bounds on the distance of
the equilibrium of any finite sampled network game and the corresponding graphon equilibrium in
terms of the population size, and we characterize optimal interventions in sampled network games
by a planner who knows the graphon but not the realization of the sampled network. Finally, as a
third contribution, we relax the assumption that agents know the sampled network and establish
a tight link between the graphon equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of an incomplete
information network game sampled from the same graphon.
Keywords: Network games, graphons, aggregative games, large population games, Nash
equilibrium, targeted interventions, Bayesian Nash equilibrium
1. Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed tremendous progress in the theory of network games,
which have been used widely to model, understand and predict behavior in a range of
settings that involve strategic interactions embedded in a networked environment [1, 2, 3].
A drawback of the standard approach, which assumes detailed information about the actual
network guiding the strategic interactions, is not only that such information may be hard
to come by, but also that predictions based on such information may not be robust. These
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observations naturally lead to the following questions: Does there exist some commonality
between equilibria of games over networks that are “similar” in the sense that they can be
viewed as being generated according to the same exogenous stochastic network formation
process? If so, does this information help with making robust predictions about equilibrium
behavior in such an ensemble of network games? Even more importantly, can such knowledge
be used to generate insights on how to intervene and regulate behavior without knowing the
exact intricate details of the network realization?
In this paper, we make progress on this set of questions by building a statistical frame-
work for the analysis of network games that exploits common structure among multiple
networks. Specifically, we are interested in analyzing and comparing the properties of the
Nash equilibria of an ensemble of network games, which we call sampled network games,
obtained by assuming that agents interact according to different realizations of an under-
lying exogenous stochastic network formation process.1 To this end, we start by defining
a new class of infinite population games, which we term graphon games. Graphon games
are defined in terms of a continuum of agents interacting according to a graphon, a general
nonparametric model for large networks [5, 6, 7] which includes Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and stochastic
block models as special cases [8, 9].2 After providing existence, uniqueness and charac-
terization results for the equilibrium of the graphon game, we conceptualize the notion of
“robust common predictions” for an ensemble of sampled network games by interpreting
the graphon as a stochastic network formation process. Specifically, we show that strate-
gic behavior in sampled network games drawn from a graphon can be well approximated
with the equilibrium of the corresponding graphon game and we provide bounds on the dis-
tance between graphon and sampled network game equilibria as a function of the population
size. In addition to highlighting a common component in strategic behavior over sampled
networks, this approach becomes particularly powerful when we turn to the analysis of inter-
ventions. Consider a social planner that aims at designing targeted interventions to shape
agents equilibrium behavior, for example to maximize welfare or profit. In many practical
situations, it is reasonable to assume that the social planner knows the underlying network
formation process, i.e., the graphon in our framework, but is unlikely to be well-informed
about the specific realizations of intricate agents interactions, i.e., the realized network. We
show that intervention strategies designed using graphon information yield almost optimal
performance when applied to sampled network games. Overall, this statistical approach to
analysis and interventions in network games offers several advantages: it requires less infor-
mation, allows for out-of-sample generalization and, in many cases, it is more efficient than
a case-by-case analysis over large unstructured graphs.
More specifically, our contributions are as follows. First, we formalize the notion of
“graphon game” in terms of a continuum of agents indexed in [0, 1] and a graphon, rep-
resented by a bounded symmetric measurable function W : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] with W (x, y)
denoting the influence of agent’s y strategy on agent x’s payoff function. We assume that
agent x’s payoff function depends on his strategy s(x) ∈ Rn as well as a local aggregate
1See [4] for a review on different models of stochastic network formation processes.
2Consistent estimation of graphon models from network data is discussed e.g. in [10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
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given by the “weighted average” of the other agents’ strategies computed according to the
graphon W . We define the Nash equilibrium for a graphon game as a strategy profile s at
which no agent can unilaterally increase its payoff function given the fixed local aggregate
of the other agents’ strategies.3 We then study fundamental properties of such equilibrium
and derive sufficient conditions in terms of the payoff functions, strategy sets and the un-
derlying graphon to guarantee existence and uniqueness. Under the same assumptions, we
additionally derive a comparative static result quantifying the effect of graphon changes on
the equilibrium outcome.
While our goal is to use graphon games to approximate equilibria of sampled network
games, we note that graphon games can also be of independent interest as a new model of
nonatomic games. In this context, our work complements previous models by incorporating
heterogeneous local effects in infinite population games. A widely considered infinite pop-
ulation model is that of mean field games [17, 18] which, while focusing on more general
dynamic stochastic interactions, assumes that each agent is influenced by the same aggre-
gate (i.e. the mean) of the whole population. Another common model is that of population
games [19], where a continuum of agents select their strategy among a finite set of options
(instead of a continuous set) and the game dynamics are typically described in terms of the
total mass of agents playing each strategy. The behavior of infinite but countable popula-
tions has also been studied in aggregative games [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26], where each agent
is influenced by the same aggregate of the strategies of the rest of the population. With
respect to all these works, graphon games capture setups that include heterogeneous local
interactions while still providing a relatively low dimensional and tractable representation.
Our second main contribution is to relate the equilibria of the infinite population graphon
game to equilibria of finite population network games sampled from the graphon. We start by
showing that any network game can be rewritten as a graphon game, hence graphon games
are a generalization of network games. We then show that the graphon game equilibrium is
a good approximation of the equilibrium of any sampled network game with high probability
and we provide a precise mathematical bound for the approximation error in terms of the
size of the sampled network. This approach allows one to extract fundamental features of
equilibrium strategies in an ensemble of large network games and thus provides robustness
against random realizations of linkages among agents or slight variations in the size of the
network.
As a third main contribution, we focus on a specific class of graphon games characterized
by linear quadratic payoff functions and scalar strategy sets. For this class of games, we show
that the graphon equilibrium can be characterized explicitly and exhibits similar properties
to equilibria in finite linear quadratic network games. Specifically, we distinguish the case of
games with strategic complements and substitutes and show that the equilibrium outcome
exhibits properties as in finite network games with complements and substitutes, see e.g.
[27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. Notably in the case of complements, the strategy of each agent at
equilibrium is proportional to its Bonacich centrality in the underlying graphon, as recently
3This definition is similar to the notion of Wardrop equilibrium used in nonatomic routing games (with a
continuum of agents) where each agent uses routes of least cost given the aggregate congestion level [15, 16].
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defined in [33]. For such linear quadratic network games we also study the effect of different
targeted intervention policies. Specifically, we show that policies derived at the level of the
graphon perform almost as good as optimal policies [34] when applied to sampled network
games with sufficiently large number of players. We then show that, at least in the case of
stochastic block models, graphon policies are easier to implement in the sense that they can
be designed at the level of communities instead of individuals.
The results discussed so far are derived under the assumption that agents have perfect
information about the sampled network. As noted in [1] and [35] among others, this as-
sumption may not hold for applications involving very large and complex networks. Our
fourth contribution is to analyze an incomplete information version of sampled network
games and develop a close linkage between the corresponding Bayesian Nash equilibrium
and the graphon equilibrium discussed above. In particular, we show that, under suitable
regularity conditions and under the assumption that the agents know the graphon generat-
ing the sampled network (but not the realization), the graphon equilibrium is an ε-Bayesian
Nash equilibrium for the incomplete information game.
In this work we suggest the use of graphons to model strategic behavior in large pop-
ulations with heterogeneous interactions. We remark that the idea of using graphons as a
support for large population analysis has been successfully applied recently in different areas
such as community detection [36], crowd-sourcing [37], signal processing [38] and optimal
control of dynamical systems [39]. The concurrent work [40] suggests the use of graphons
to extend the setup of mean-field games (which differently from network games are dynamic
and stochastic games) to heterogeneous settings. Finally, we remark that the idea of inter-
preting observed graphs as random realizations from an underlying random graph model has
recently been used in the study of centrality measures in [41] for stochastic block models and
in [33] for graphon models. The authors of these papers study among others Bonacich cen-
trality, which is known to coincide with the equilibrium of a specific type of network games
(with scalar nonnegative strategies, quadratic payoff functions and strategic complements).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some motivating
examples. In Section 3 we recall the concept of graphons and we define network games
sampled from a graphon. In Section 4 we introduce graphon games, we define the graphon
equilibrium and we study its properties. In Section 5 we investigate the relation between
equilibria in sampled network games and in graphon games. In Section 6 we specialize
our theoretical results to linear quadratic games and we study optimal interventions. In
Section 7 and Section 8 we apply our results to the two motivating examples of Section 2
and we provide supporting numerical simulations. In Section 9 we extend our results to
incomplete information. Finally, Section 10 concludes the paper. Appendix A derives an
equivalent reformulation of the graphon equilibrium as a fixed point of a best response
operator. Appendix B contains the proofs of the results stated in the main text as well
as supporting lemmas. Appendix C presents additional results on convergence of equilibria
of network games whose network converges to a graphon and extends convergence results
of equilibria in sampled network games to more general classes of graphons than the one
considered in the main text.
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Notation
We denote by Rn the space of n-dimensional vectors, by L2([0, 1]) the space of square
integrable functions defined on [0, 1] and by L2([0, 1];Rn) the space of square integrable
vector valued functions defined on [0, 1]. The norms in these spaces are denoted by ‖v‖ :=√∑n
h=1[v]
2
h, ‖f‖L2 :=
√∫ 1
0
f(x)2dx, ‖g‖L2;Rn :=
√∫ 1
0
‖g(x)‖2dx, respectively. [v]h denotes
the h-th component of the vector v. With the exception of N and R (that denote the sets
of natural and real numbers, respectively), we use blackboard bold symbols (such as O)
to denote operators acting on L2([0, 1]) or on L2([0, 1];Rn). The induced operator norm
are denoted by |||O||| := sup{f |‖f‖L2=1} ‖Of‖L2 and |||O||| := sup{g|‖g‖L2;Rn=1} ‖Og‖L2;Rn . We
denote by λmax(L) and by r(L) the largest eigenvalue and the spectral radius of the linear
integral operator Lf :=
∫ 1
0
L(x, y)f(y)dy with symmetric kernel L(x, y) = L(y, x). We
denote sets by using calligraphic symbols (such as S) and the set of subsets of Rn by 2Rn .
The symbol 1N denotes the vector of all ones in RN and 1[0,1](x) the function constantly
equal to one in [0, 1]. I is the identity operator and I the identity matrix.
2. Motivating examples
To motivate our proposed framework and derive some intuition, we first present some
examples of network games and investigate their equilibria as a function of the number of
agents. We start by considering a setting where N agents interact over a symmetric network
with adjacency matrix P [N ], where P
[N ]
ij = P
[N ]
ji ∈ [0, 1] denotes the level of interaction among
agent i and j.4 For the examples of this section, we focus on linear quadratic network games
and assume that each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N} chooses an action si ∈ R≥0 (capturing for
example his effort level on a given activity) to maximize the payoff
U(si, zi(s)) = −1
2
(si)2 + (β + αzi(s))si, (1)
which depends quadratically on his own action si and linearly on the local aggregate zi(s) :=
1
N
∑
j P
[N ]
ij s
j.5 The parameter α ∈ R in (1) captures how much the local aggregate affects
each agent’s marginal return, which could either be an increasing (strategic complements) or
decreasing (strategic substitutes) function of zi(s) depending on the sign of α. For simplicity
in this section we focus on strategic complements games and therefore assume α > 0. The
parameter β > 0 represents the standalone marginal return that does not depend on other’s
actions. This simple canonical model has been widely studied in the literature (see e.g.
[1, 2, 3]) and it is known that, for any given network P [N ] and α sufficiently small, the Nash
equilibrium action of agent i, s¯i, is proportional to its Bonacich centrality; so that compactly
the Nash equilibrium profile is given by s¯ = β(IN − αNP [N ])−11N [28].
In this paper we consider an ensemble of network games, whose networks are sampled
according to a stochastic network formation process (see Figure 1). Our goal is to understand
4We refer to P [N ] as a network or graph interchangeably.
5In network games typically there is no factor 1N in the definition of z
i(s). Since we study the behavior
when N changes we find it useful to consider this factor explicitly.
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Figure 1: Ensemble of network games.
the similarities between the Nash equilibria (e.g., s¯A, s¯B, s¯C) of the different games belonging
to such an ensemble, that is, games in which the agents have the same payoff function, e.g.
(1), but interact according to different networks (e.g., P
[N ]
A , P
[N ]
B , P
[N ]
C ) sampled from the
same underlying stochastic network formation process. We refer to such games as sampled
network games.
Two remarks are in order. First, in this framework the stochastic network formation
process is exogenous, that is, link formation is not a result of strategic decisions of the
agents.6 Second, throughout the paper (with the exception of Section 9), we assume that
agents in each sampled network game have complete information (i.e., sampled network and
payoffs are common knowledge).
In the next example, we consider an ensemble of network games generated by using a
stochastic block model as stochastic network formation process. Stochastic block models
are an extension of the widely studied Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model (where pair of
nodes are independently linked with probability p ∈ [0, 1]) to a setting with finitely many
communities and can be used to encode more complex agents interactions. For example, the
homophily phenomenon (whereby agents belonging to the same community tend to interact
more than agents from different communities, see [42, 43]) can be captured with a stochastic
block model by assuming that links among nodes within the same community are more likely
to form than links among nodes across different communities.
Example 1. (Community structure)
As a first example, we consider networks formed according to a stochastic block model where
agents are divided into K communities and we denote by wk the probability that a random
agent belongs to community k, with
∑K
k=1wk = 1. Additionally, we assume that agents
belonging to the same community form a link with Bernoulli probability gin while agents
from different communities form a link with probability gout (typically smaller than gin).
This network formation process can model for example the formation of friendships in a
school, where same race students have higher probability of forming a friendship [43].
The first line of Figure 2 shows three networks obtained by randomly partitioning N = 16
agents into two communities (red and blue) with probabilities wred = 0.25 and wblue =
6We refer to [4] for a discussion of random and strategic network formation models.
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Figure 2: Five realizations of networks formed according to the stochastic network formation process de-
scribed in Example 1 and their corresponding equilibria (for payoff as in (1) with α = 0.8, β = 1).
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0.75 and then connecting each pair of agents with Bernoulli probability gin = 0.8 if they
belong to the same community and gout = 0.1 if they belong to different communities. These
three networks could for example model the friendship networks in three different classes of
students. The second line of Figure 2 shows the Bonacich centrality of each agent (and thus
its equilibrium effort in the simple network game with linear quadratic payoffs described in
Eq. (1)) in the three different networks. While such profiles are different, one can identify
some common features such as the tendency of red agents to exert lower efforts at equilibrium
than blue agents. The third and fourth lines of Figure 2 show two network realizations
and their corresponding equilibria when the networks are sampled according to the same
stochastic process but for N = 100 and N = 250 agents (these could be the friendship
networks in two different schools of 100 and 250 students, respectively). In this case, the
behavioral characteristics of red and blue agents become even more stark and interestingly
almost deterministic.
In the previous example we considered a stochastic network formation process where
agents are partitioned into a finite number of different communities (or types). It is inter-
esting to consider also cases where agents types may take infinitely many values. The next
example illustrates one such case where an agent’s type is given by its location.
Example 2. (Location model)
We consider a location model where N agents are independently located uniformly at random
along a line segment represented by the interval [0,1] (e.g., homeowners along a street) and
we assume that the level of interaction between agent i and j is a decreasing function of their
spatial distance.7 This assumption captures the natural effect that closeby agents affect each
other’s payoff function more than agents that are far apart. We consider a linear quadratic
game where the payoff of each agent is given by (1) with α > 0 so that the game exhibits
strategic complementarities. For example, the action si could represent the effort agent i
exerts to maintain the curb appeal of his home, which is subject to local complementarities
since an agent’s marginal return increases when his neighbors efforts increase.8
Figure 3 illustrates three possible network realizations for increasing population sizes and
the corresponding Nash equilibria. Again, one can observe similarities between equilibria of
different sampled network games. For example it seems that agents in more central loca-
tions exert higher efforts at equilibrium. Moreover, this trend becomes sharper and “more
deterministic” as the population size increases.
The previous examples motivate a number of questions:
Q1: What is the common structure of Nash equilibria in network games sampled from a
common stochastic network formation process?
7The precise relation is given in the continuation of this example in Section 3.2.
8Consistently with our remark at the beginning of this section, we stress that this is not a Hotelling
model where agents make strategic choices about their locations along the line segment. In our setup each
agent’s location is assigned uniformly at random in the interval [0, 1]. Moreover, we note that increasing the
number of agents in this setting increases the density of agents in [0, 1] and not the length of the line.
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Figure 3: Three realizations of networks formed according to the stochastic network formation process
described in Example 2 and their corresponding equilibria (for payoff as in (1) with α = 3 and β = 1). The
line along which agents are located is represented as a semicircle for simplicity of visualization. The color
of the nodes is associated to the agents location along the line (blue being one extreme and red the other
extreme). Edges between agents that are further apart are in lighter color.
Q2: Do Nash equilibria become suitably close to each other as the number of nodes in the
sampled networks increases? Will they eventually concentrate around a deterministic
strategy profile?
Q3: If yes, is it possible to derive such deterministic strategy profile by knowing only the
agent payoff functions and the stochastic network formation process?
Q4: Can we design policy interventions based on the knowledge of agents payoff functions
and the stochastic network formation process? How successful will this policy be when
applied to sampled network games?
In the rest of the paper we answer these questions for a general stochastic network
formation process represented by a graphon, which as detailed in Section 3 includes the
examples discussed here as special cases, and for a more general class of payoff functions
than the linear quadratic case considered here.
3. A statistical framework for network games
In this section, we present the definition of graphons and show how they can be used as
a stochastic network formation model. We then define a sampled network game as a game
over a network sampled according to the graphon.
3.1. Graphons and the graphon operator
Mathematically, a graphon is a bounded symmetric measurable function W : [0, 1]2 7→
[0, 1]. Graphons have originally been introduced as the limit of a sequence of graphs when
the number of nodes tends to infinity [6]. In this sense, W (x, y) can be interpreted as
measuring the level of interaction between two infinitesimal agents x and y belonging to the
[0, 1] interval. Many properties of a graphon can be obtained by analyzing the properties of
an associated linear operator which we introduce next, see also [6, Section 7.5].
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Definition 1 (Graphon operator). For a given graphon W , we define the associated
graphon operator W as the integral operator W : L2([0, 1]) 7→ L2([0, 1]) given by
f(x) 7→ (Wf)(x) =
∫ 1
0
W (x, y)f(y)dy,
where L2([0, 1]) denotes the space of square integrable functions defined on [0, 1].
Intuitively, the graphon operator plays the same role that the adjacency matrix of a
graph plays in network analysis. Specifically, the graphon operator W is a linear operator
mapping functions to functions, exactly as the adjacency matrix of a network is a linear
operator mapping vectors to vectors. In particular, one can introduce spectral properties of
the graphon operator, [44, Definition 3.7.2].
Definition 2 (Eigenvalues and eigenfunctions). A complex number λ is an eigenvalue
of the operator W if there exists a nonzero function ψ ∈ L2([0, 1]), called the eigenfunction,
such that
(Wψ)(x) = λψ(x). (2)
In the next proposition we summarize the main properties of the graphon operator, which
follow from the symmetry of W and will be used in our subsequent analysis. These facts
are know, as detailed in Appendix B.
Proposition 1 (Properties of W). The following hold:
1. W is a linear Hilbert-Schmidt integral operator (and is thus a continuous, bounded and
compact operator);
2. all the eigenvalues of W are real;
3. |||W||| := supf∈L2([0,1]),‖f‖L2=1 ‖Wf‖L2 = r(W) = λmax(W);
where r(W) and λmax(W) are the spectral radius and the largest eigenvalue of W.
3.2. Graphons as a stochastic network formation model
While graphons have been introduced as the limit of graphs for infinite number of nodes,
in this work we focus on a second interpretation of graphons as random graph models [6,
Chapter 10]. This statistical interpretation is the building block of our framework, since it
allows us to use graphons as a stochastic network formation model. In the next definition,
we illustrate how a graphon can be used to describe a probability distribution over the space
of networks and how one can sample from this distribution to construct a sampled network.
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a) W (x, y) b) P
[5]
w c) P
[5]
s
Figure 4: Illustration of the sampling procedure described in Definition 3 for N = 5. a) The graphon. b) The
weighted adjacency matrix P
[5]
w associated with the random sample [t1, . . . , t5] = [0.03, 0.31, 0.69, 0.82, 0.95].
c) A realization of the 0-1 adjacency matrix P
[5]
s . For the graphon a linear grayscale colormap is used with
white associated to W = 0 and black to W = 1. For P
[5]
w the width of the line is proportional to the weight
of the corresponding edge. In P
[5]
s any edge has weight 1.
Definition 3 (Sampling procedure). Given any graphon W and any desired number
N of nodes, uniformly and independently sample N points {ti}Ni=1 from [0, 1] and define a
weighted adjacency matrix P
[N ]
w as follows
[P [N ]w ]ij =
{
W (ti, tj), if i 6= j,
0, if i = j.
Starting from P
[N ]
w , define the 0-1 adjacency matrix P
[N ]
s as the adjacency matrix corre-
sponding to a graph with N nodes obtained by randomly connecting nodes i, j ∈ [1, N ] with
Bernoulli probability [P
[N ]
w ]ij.
Remark 1. In the context of network games, the {ti}Ni=1 can be interpreted as agents types
(e.g, in the community structure model given in Example 1 an agent’s type represents the
community to which the agent belongs, while in the location model given in Example 2 an
agent’s type represents its location). In this sense, the graphon value W (x, y) is encoding
information about the level of interaction between two arbitrary agents of type x and y.
From here on we are going to assume that the {ti}Ni=1 are ordered such that ti ≤ ti+1 for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. This is without loss of generality, since it simply corresponds to a
relabeling of the nodes. Figure 4 illustrates the sampling procedure described in Definition 3.
Note that both P
[N ]
w and P
[N ]
s are stochastic matrices. The difference between the two is that
P
[N ]
w ∈ [0, 1]N×N while P [N ]s ∈ {0, 1}N×N .
To develop more intuition on the framework of graphons and its connection to other well-
known stochastic network formation processes we start by noting that for any p ∈ [0, 1], the
constant graphon W (x, y) ≡ p coincides with the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model with
edge probability p. We next present two graphon models that can be used to encode the
stochastic network formation processes discussed in the motivating Examples 1 and 2.
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Figure 5: Left: The SBM graphon of Example 1. Note that the agents in position x = 0.1 and x = 0.5
belong to the same community and are thus affected in the same way by the rest of the agents. Right:
The minmax graphon of Example 2. In both cases W (x, ·) for three different values of x and W (x, y) as a
function of both x and y are shown. A linear grayscale colormap is used with white associated to W = 0
and black to W = 1.
Example 1 (Continued). The community structure described in Example 1 can be gen-
erated from the following graphon stochastic network formation model. We partition [0, 1]
into K disjoint intervals {Ck}Kk=1, with |Ck| = wk, and use a piecewise constant graphon W
constructed as follows
WSBM(x, y) =
{
gin if there exists k s.t. x ∈ Ck, y ∈ Ck,
gout otherwise.
We denote this graphon with the label “SBM” because of its relation to Stochastic Block
Models. Figure 5 (left) illustrates the graphon of Example 1 with K = 2 communities of size
[w1, w2] = [0.75, 0.25] and with gin = 0.8, gout = 0.1. In this case, we selected C1 = [0, 0.75],
C2 = (0.75, 1].
Example 2 (Continued). Consider next the location model of Example 2 and let x ∈
[0, 1] denote the agents position along the line. The assumption that the interaction level
between any two agents is a decreasing function of their spatial distance can be represented
for example by using the “minmax” graphon
WMM(x, y) = min(x, y)(1−max(x, y)).
Figure 5 (right) illustrates such a graphon. The middle plot, for example, shows that the
agent located at x = 0.5 is more sensitive to the strategies of the agents around him (i.e. for
y ≈ 0.5) than to the strategies of the corner agents (i.e. for y ≈ 0 or y ≈ 1).
Overall, graphons can be used to encode a general class of stochastic network forma-
tion models that includes as special cases Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs and stochastic block
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models. More generally, it can be shown that the distribution of any exchangeable random
graph [45] can be characterized by a function W as discussed above [46]. Hence, graphons
provide a flexible and general model for stochastic network formation.
3.3. Sampled network games
In this section we introduce the concept of network games sampled from a graphon W .
We start by formally defining a network game as a game where N agents interact over a
network P [N ] and each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N} aims at selecting a vector strategy si ∈ Rn in
its feasible set S i ⊆ Rn to maximize a payoff function
U(si, zi(s)) (3)
where s := [si]Ni=1 ∈ RNn and zi(s) := 1N
∑N
j=1[P
[N ]]ijs
j denotes the local aggregate (com-
puted according to the network P [N ]). Note that we assume that each agent has the same
payoff function U . This assumption simplifies the comparison of populations of different
sizes. We denote compactly a network game with the notation G [N ]({S i}Ni=1, U, P [N ]) and we
say “a network game G [N ] with graph P [N ]” if we need to stress the role of the graph.
We next specialize this definition to games where the network of interactions is formed
according to a graphon. Intuitively, we define a sampled network game as a game where N
agents of type {ti}Ni=1, randomly sampled in [0, 1], interact over a network formed according
to the process described in Definition 3. Note that, we consider both games played over the
weighted adjacency matrix P
[N ]
w ∈ [0, 1]N×N and the 0-1 adjacency matrix P [N ]s ∈ {0, 1}N×N
and we use the symbol P
[N ]
w/s for statements that hold in both cases.
Definition 4 (Sampled network game). Given a graphon W , a payoff function U and
a set valued function S : [0, 1]→ 2Rn, we define a sampled network game among N agents of
type {ti}Ni=1 as G [N ]({S(ti)}Ni=1, U, P [N ]w/s), where the types {ti}Ni=1 are sampled uniformly and
independently at random from [0, 1] and P
[N ]
w/s is as in Definition 3.
4. Graphon games
An interesting feature that emerges from the two examples discussed in Section 2, is
that the equilibria of sampled network games seem to concentrate around a deterministic
strategy profile when the number of agents N is sufficiently large. To better understand
this behavior, we start by constructing an “auxiliary game” which we term a graphon game
consisting of a continuum of players interacting according to the graphon W .
Our main goal is to understand the equilibria of network games sampled from a graphon
in terms of the equilibria of the corresponding graphon game. In addition, we note that
graphon games can be of independent interest for modeling nonatomic games involving a
continuum of players, as done for example in the traffic literature. The results derived in
this section and in the supporting Appendix A may be of separate interest in such a context.
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4.1. Graphon games: The model
Consider a continuum set of agents where each agent is indexed by the continuum variable
x ∈ [0, 1] instead of the finite index i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and has a strategy vector which is denoted
by s(x) ∈ Rn instead of si ∈ Rn. As in the finite population case, we assume local constraints
of the form s(x) ∈ S(x), where S(x) : [0, 1]→ 2Rn is a set-valued function. In finite network
games, each agent computes its best response to the local aggregate zi(s) := 1
N
∑N
j=1 P
[N ]
ij s
j
according to the weights of the underlying graph P [N ]. In the infinite population case,
the natural mathematical object to describe the network of interactions is a graphon W :
[0, 1]2 → [0, 1], as described in Section 3.1. For any graphon W , we can define the local
aggregate experienced by agent x as the “weighted average” of the other agents actions
according to the graphon:
z(x | s) :=
∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s(y)dy :=

∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s1(y)dy
...∫ 1
0
W (x, y)sn(y)dy
 =
 (Ws1)(x)...
(Wsn)(x)

where W is the graphon operator as introduced in Definition 1.
Remark 2. Note that for graphon games a strategy profile s : [0, 1]→ Rn is a vector valued
function. In other words, s(x) = [s1(x), . . . , sn(x)]
> for all x ∈ [0, 1]. In the following, we
require that any strategy profile is square integrable, that is s(x) ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn).9
As in network games, the goal of each agent in a graphon game is to select the strategy
s(x) ∈ S(x) that maximizes its payoff given by
U(s(x), z(x | s)). (4)
Similar to network games, we assume that the payoff function of an agent x depends on
his strategy s(x) and his local aggregate z(x | s). To focus on network effects we again
assume that all agent have the same payoff function U . Note that such a payoff function
has the same structural form as in network games. The difference in the two setups is the
way in which the local aggregate (zi(s) for network games and z(x | s) for graphon games)
is evaluated. To sum up, in a graphon game each agent aims at computing its best response
to the local aggregate induced by the strategy profile s as follows
sbr(x | s) := arg max
s˜∈S(x)
U(s˜, z(x | s)). (5)
Note that such a best response might in general be set-valued. Moreover, since there is
a continuum of agents, the contribution of agent x to the aggregate z(x | s) is negligible.
Consequently, the decision variable s˜ affects only the first argument in the payoff function
in (5). We summarize the previous discussion in the following definition.
9This implies that each component is square integrable, that is, sk(x) ∈ L2([0, 1]) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
In fact for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds ‖sk‖L2 =
√∫ 1
0
sk(x)2dx ≤
√∫ 1
0
‖s(x)‖2dx = ‖s‖L2;Rn .
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Definition 5 (Graphon game). A graphon game G is defined in terms of a continuum
set of agents indexed by [0, 1], a graphon W , a payoff function U as in (4) and for each
agent x a strategy set S(x).
In the following, we say “a graphon game G with graphon W” if we need to stress the role of
the graphon and we explicitly write G(S, U,W ) is we want to stress the role of all the game
primitives.
4.2. Graphon games: Equilibrium concept
Paralleling the literature on nonatomic games (see e.g., [47, 48, 15, 16]), one can extend
the concept of Nash equilibrium to graphon games.
Definition 6 (Nash equilibrium). A function s¯ ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn) with associated local ag-
gregate z¯(x) := z(x | s¯) = ∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s¯(y)dy is a Nash equilibrium for the graphon game
G(S, U,W ) if for all x ∈ [0, 1], we have s¯(x) ∈ S(x) and
U(s¯(x), z¯(x)) ≥ U(s˜, z¯(x)) for all s˜ ∈ S(x).
In other words, a function s¯ is a Nash equilibrium if, for each agent x, the strategy s¯(x)
is a best response of that agent to the strategies of the other agents. Mathematically,
s¯(x) ∈ sbr(x | s¯), ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
In the rest of the section we study Nash equilibrium properties under the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Payoff). The function U(s, z) : Rn × Rn → R in (4) is continuously
differentiable and strongly concave in s with uniform constant αU for each value of z ∈ Rn.
Moreover, ∇sU(s, z) is uniformly Lipschitz in z with constant `U for all s ∈ Rn. For each
x ∈ [0, 1] the set S(x) is convex and closed.
Assumption 2 (Constraint set). A) There exists zˆ ∈ Rn and M > 0 such that
‖ arg maxs˜∈S(x) U(s˜, zˆ)‖ ≤ M for all x ∈ [0, 1]. B) There exists a compact set S such that
S(x) ⊆ S for all x ∈ [0, 1] so that smax := maxs∈S ‖s‖ <∞.
Note that Assumption 2B) implies Assumption 2A). We consider these assumptions sepa-
rately since some of our results hold under the sole Assumption 2A), which is less restrictive.
4.3. Graphon games: Properties of the equilibrium
To study equilibrium properties, we derive in Appendix A an equivalent characterization
of the Nash equilibrium of a graphon game as a fixed point of a best response operator.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium is then an immediate consequence of Schauder fixed point
theorem.
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Theorem 1 (Existence). Suppose that the graphon game G(S, U,W ) satisfies Assump-
tions 1 and 2B). Then it admits at least one Nash equilibrium.
Uniqueness on the other hand is not always guaranteed. In fixed point theory it is well
known that a sufficient condition for uniqueness is contractiveness. We apply this result to
graphon games in the next theorem by exploiting the following additional assumption.
Assumption 3 (Contraction). Suppose that
`U
αU
· λmax(W) < 1,
where λmax(W) is the largest eigenvalue of the graphon operator W.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness). Suppose that the graphon game G(S, U,W ) satisfies Assump-
tions 1, 2A) and 3. Then it admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
Note that in Theorem 2, Assumption 2B) is not needed. In other words the strategy sets
S(x) do not need to be bounded. This is because for contraction mappings existence and
uniqueness of the fixed point can be guaranteed under the sole assumption that the domain
is closed and convex, without the need of compactness.10
Finally, for graphon games satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 2, so that the Nash
equilibrium is unique, we study the effect of graphon perturbations.
Theorem 3 (Comparative statics). Suppose that the graphon game G(S, U,W ) satisfies
Assumptions 1, 2A), 3 and let s¯ be its unique Nash equilibrium. Consider a perturbed graphon
W˜ and let s˜ be any Nash equilibrium of the graphon game G(S, U, W˜ ). Then it holds
‖s¯− s˜‖L2;Rn ≤ `U/αU‖s˜‖L
2;Rn
1− `U/αUλmax(W)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W− W˜∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣, (6)
where for any linear integral operator O, we denote by |||O||| := maxf∈L2([0,1]) ‖Of‖L2 the
operator norm. If additionally Assumption 2B) holds then
‖s¯− s˜‖L2;Rn ≤ `U/αUsmax
1− `U/αUλmax(W)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W− W˜∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣. (7)
The result in Theorem 3, besides being of interest on its own, is fundamental for the
finite population analysis performed in the next section.
5. Analysis of sampled network games
The objective of this section is to formally study the relation between sampled network
games and the graphon game described in the previous sections. To this end, we start by
showing that any network game can be equivalently reformulated as a graphon game.
10On the other hand, Assumption 2A) is needed to guarantee that the best response to any strategy profile
in L2([0, 1];Rn) belongs to the same space (i.e., it is square integrable).
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5.1. Network games are graphon games
In network games Nash equilibria are vectors of RNn while in graphon games they are
functions of L2([0, 1];Rn). To compare these two objects, we define a one-to-one correspon-
dence between vector and functions using a uniform partition U [N ] = {U [N ]1 ,U [N ]2 , . . . ,U [N ]N }
of [0, 1] obtained by setting U [N ]k = [k−1N , kN ), k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} and U [N ]N = [N−1N , 1]. In-
tuitively, we are going to pair each agent i in a finite network game with the interval U [N ]i .
For any n,N ∈ N we can then define the step function equilibrium s¯[N ](x) ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn)
corresponding to any equilibrium s¯[N ] ∈ RNn of a network game as follows
s¯[N ](x) := s¯
i
[N ], ∀x ∈ U [N ]i , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
By exploiting this reformulation we can compare the Nash equilibria of graphon and network
games (or of network games with different population sizes) by working in the L2([0, 1];Rn)
domain. Similarly, the uniform partition U [N ] can be used to define a one-to-one correspon-
dence between any graph P [N ] ∈ RN×N and a corresponding step function graphon W [N ]
obtained by setting
W [N ](x, y) := P
[N ]
ij , ∀(x, y) ∈ U [N ]i × U [N ]j , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (8)
The following theorem shows that the step function equilibria of any network game with
graph P [N ] coincide with the Nash equilibria of the graphon game with step function graphon
W [N ] corresponding to P [N ].
Theorem 4. A vector s¯[N ] ∈ RNn is a Nash equilibrium of the game G [N ]({S i}Ni=1, U, P [N ])
with N players, payoff function U as in (3), strategy sets S i and graph P [N ] if and only
if the corresponding step function equilibrium s¯[N ](x) ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn) is a Nash equilibrium
of the graphon game G(S[N ], U,W [N ]) with payoff function as in (4), set valued function
S[N ](x) := S i for all x ∈ Ui and step function graphon W [N ] corresponding to P [N ].
5.2. Equilibria in sampled network games
Our next result relates the Nash equilibria of sampled network games, as introduced
in Section 3.3, to the equilibrium of the corresponding graphon game. Specifically, in the
following theorem, we derive a bound on the distance between such equilibria that holds
for any graphon satisfying Assumption 3 and the following additional regularity condition.
A more general result that requires only Assumption 3 is given in Appendix C.3. We here
focus on Lipschitz graphons to obtain simpler bounds.
Assumption 4 (Lipschitz continuity). There exists a constant L > 0 and a sequence of
non-overlapping intervals Ik = [ωk−1, ωk) defined by 0 = ω0 < · · · < ωΩ+1 = 1, for a (finite)
Ω ∈ N and k ∈ {1, . . . ,Ω + 1}, such that for any k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,Ω + 1}, any set Ikl = Ik × Il
and pairs (x, y) ∈ Ikl, (x′, y′) ∈ Ikl we have that
|W (x, y)−W (x′, y′)| ≤ L(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|).
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Assumption 4 implies that the graphon W is piecewise Lipschitz (over the intervals
Ik×Il) and is a common assumption in the context of graphon estimation, see e.g. [10]. We
note that both the minmax graphon (see Lemma 5 in Appendix B) and any SBM graphon
satisfy this assumption. In the following, we use the symbol w/s to denote statements that
apply to both weighted and 0-1 adjacency matrices.
Theorem 5 (Distance). Consider a graphon game G(S, U,W ) where each player has pay-
off function U as in (4) and homogeneous strategy set, i.e., S(x) = S for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose that G satisfies Assumptions 1, 2B), 3 and 4. Let s¯ be its unique Nash equilibrium
and fix any sequence {δN}∞N=1 such that δN ≤ e−1 and log(N/δN )N → 0. Let s¯[N ]w/s be an arbitrary
step function equilibrium of the sampled network game G [N ]({S}Ni=1, U, P [N ]w/s), as introduced
in Section 3.3. Then with probability at least 1− δN , for N large enough, it holds
‖s¯[N ]w − s¯‖L2;Rn ≤ 2K˜
√
(L2 − Ω2)d2N + ΩdN =: K˜ρ(N)
where K˜ = `U/αUsmax
1−`U/αUλmax(W) and dN :=
1
N
+
√
8 log(N/δN )
N
→ 0 as N → ∞. Moreover, with
probability at least 1− 2δN , for N large enough, it holds
‖s¯[N ]s − s¯‖L2;Rn ≤ K˜
(
ρ(N) +
√
4 log(2N/δN)
N
)
.
Consequently, ‖s¯[N ]w/s − s¯‖L2;Rn → 0 almost surely when N →∞.
Remark 3. The previous theorem provides bounds on the distance between the equilibria
of graphon and sampled network games that hold with high probability. One can choose
the desired confidence level by tuning the value of δN . For example one can select constant
confidence δN ≡ δ ∈ (0, e−1) or polynomial confidence δN = 1Nk for any k > 0, since for N
large enough 1
Nk
≤ e−1 and log(N/δN )
N
= log(N
k+1)
N
= (k + 1) logN
N
→ 0.
The proof of Theorem 5 is given in Appendix B and consists of three main steps. First,
by Theorem 4 one can compare the equilibrium of the graphon game G(S, U,W ) and the
equilibria of any sampled network game G [N ]({S}Ni=1, U, P [N ]w/s) by equivalently comparing the
equilibria of two graphon games, one over the original graphon W and one over the step
function graphon W
[N ]
w/s corresponding to P
[N ]
w/s. Second, by Theorem 3 the distance of the
equilibria in these two graphon games can be upper bounded with a quantity that depends
on the distance of the corresponding graphon operators. Third, the distance of the graphon
operators can be upper bounded as shown for example in [6] (for generic graphons) and in
[33] (for graphons satisfying Assumption 4). Almost sure convergence can then be obtained
by using the derived bounds with δN =
1
N2
→ 0 and Borel-Cantelli lemma.
In many practical contexts, it might also be of interest to quantify the distance between
the equilibria of two network games sampled from the same graphon. Such a result can
be used to judge the robustness of the equilibrium outcome to stochastic variations in the
realized links or in the number of players. Theorem 5 can be used to obtain such a bound,
since by triangular inequality ‖s¯[N1]w/s − s¯[N2]w/s‖L2;Rn ≤ ‖s¯[N1]w/s − s¯‖L2;Rn + ‖s¯− s¯[N2]w/s‖L2;Rn .
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6. Linear quadratic graphon games and interventions
In this section we specialize our results to the linear quadratic setting introduced in the
motivating examples of Section 2. Specifically, we focus on a particular class of graphon
games where the strategy of each agent is scalar and nonnegative so that S(x) = R≥0 for all
x ∈ [0, 1] and the payoff function of an arbitrary agent playing strategy s and subject to the
local aggregate z is quadratic in s and linear in z
U(s, z) = −1
2
s2 + s[αz + β], (9)
for α ∈ R, β > 0 as defined in Section 2. In the first part of this section we show that it is
possible to derive a closed form expression for the Nash equilibria of graphon games with this
payoff structure. This finding parallels similar results for linear quadratic network games
[28, 31]. In the second part of the section, we use this characterization of the equilibrium to
study optimal interventions by a central planner in sampled network games.
6.1. Nash equilibrium characterization
To start, we notice that the derivative of the payoff function is
∂U(s, z)
∂s
= −s+ [αz + β].
This implies that the best response for each agent x is given by
sbr(x | s) = max{0, [αz(x | s) + β]}. (10)
It therefore follows that U satisfies Assumption 1 with αU = 1, `U = |α|. Note also that
Assumption 2A) is satisfied (take e.g. zˆ = 0,M = β).
By Theorem 2, a Nash equilibrium exists and is unique if
|α|λmax(W) < 1. (11)
To further study the properties of such equilibrium, we distinguish the two cases α > 0 and
α < 0.
6.1.1. Games of strategic complements
Suppose that α > 0. In this case, we can immediately see from (10) that the best
response of each agent is an increasing function of the local aggregate z(x | s), i.e., this is a
game of strategic complements [28]. We start by proving that the unique Nash equilibrium
s¯ is internal (i.e., it satisfies s¯(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]). To this end, note that since α, β > 0
and z¯(x) := z(x | s¯) ≥ 0, it holds ∂U(0,z¯(x))
∂s
> 0. This immediately allows us to conclude
that, at the Nash equilibrium, all the agents have a strictly positive strategy. If that was
not the case they could in fact increase their payoff by slightly increasing their strategy from
0 to s˜, thus obtaining the payoff
U(s˜, z¯(x)) = U(0, z¯(x)) +
∂U(0, z¯(x))
∂s
s˜+O(s˜2)
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which is strictly greater than U(0, z¯(x)) for s˜ small. Since the Nash equilibrium is internal,
from (10) it must hold
s¯(x) = αz(x | s¯) + β ⇒ s¯(x) = α(Ws¯)(x) + β
⇒ (Is¯)(x) = α(Ws¯)(x) + β ⇒ ((I− αW)s¯)(x) = β1[0,1](x).
The condition |α|λmax(W) < 1 derived in (11) implies, by Proposition 1, that |α| <
1/r(W), where r(W) is the spectral radius of W. Consequently, the operator (I − αW) is
invertible and we obtain
s¯(x) = β((I− αW)−11[0,1])(x) (12)
which corresponds to the Bonacich centrality of agent x in the graphon W , as defined in
[33].
6.1.2. Games of strategic substitutes
If α < 0 we see that the best response in (10) is decreasing in z(x | s), therefore this is a
game of strategic substitutes [31]. In this case it is not possible to guarantee a priori that the
Nash equilibrium is internal. Nonetheless, by performing the same steps as in the previous
section, we can guarantee that under condition (11) a positive function s¯ is an internal Nash
equilibrium if and only if it is a positive solution to
s¯(x) = β((I− αW)−11[0,1])(x) = β((I+ |α|W)−11[0,1])(x). (13)
It is possible to expand (I + |α|W)−1 by using a Neumann series reformulation (as for the
Bonacich centrality in (12)) however the even and odd terms of such series have opposite
signs. Consequently, one cannot conclude a priori that (13) is strictly positive.
6.2. Optimal interventions in sampled network games
As an application of our framework, we study the problem of regulating agents actions in
sampled network games. Our goal is to use the graphon framework to design almost optimal
interventions in sampled network games without knowledge of the details of the sampled
network.
Our starting point is [34] which focuses on optimal interventions in network games.
Specifically, we consider the setup of linear quadratic network games with strategic comple-
mentarities (i.e. α > 0). This could, for example, model a network of students whose effort
in studying, represented by si, creates positive peer effects on their friends, see e.g. [49]. We
then consider a central planner interested in maximizing the average social welfare (defined
as the average of the agents payoffs at equilibrium) by means of interventions that directly
modify the standalone marginal return for an arbitrary agent i from β to βˆi, leading to the
modified payoff function
U(si, zi | βˆi) = −1
2
(si)2 + si[αzi + βˆi]. (14)
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In the student network example, the control strategy of the planner could be to provide
additional tutoring to student i to boost his academic performance. We assume that the
planner is subject to the following constraint which penalizes interventions in a convex form
(to capture for example the fact that more tutoring for a student is increasingly costly):
N∑
i=1
(β − βˆi)2 ≤ C [N ].
Note that we allow the budget C [N ] to depend on the population size. This can model
the fact that networks with more agents are allocated a proportionally higher budget. By
using the equilibrium characterization s¯i = [αz¯i + βˆi] with z¯i = 1
N
∑
j P
[N ]
ij s¯
j, the objective
function of the central planner can be rewritten as
T [N ](βˆ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
U(s¯i, z¯i | βˆi) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
−1
2
(s¯i)2 + s¯i[αz¯i + βˆi]
)
=
1
2N
N∑
i=1
(s¯i)2,
where βˆ := [βˆi]Ni=1. This lead to the following optimization problem for the central planner
max
βˆ∈RN
1
2N
N∑
i=1
(s¯i)2,
s.t. s¯ =
[
I − αP [N ]
N
]−1
βˆ,∑N
i=1(β − βˆi)2 ≤ C [N ].
(15)
The solution to (15) is in general a complex function of α, β, P [N ] and C [N ]. In [34] it is
however shown that the following is a good heuristic when α and C [N ] are large.
Definition 7 (Network heuristic policy). Consider a network game G [N ](R≥0, U, P [N ])
where U is as in (14) with α > 0. Let v
[N ]
1 be the normalized (nonnegative) eigenvector of
P [N ] associated with the dominant eigenvalue. The network heuristic policy is
βˆ
[N ]
nh := β1N +
√
C [N ]v
[N ]
1 . (16)
Intuitively, the network heuristic policy exploits local complementarities by allocating
budget to agents that are tightly connected to each other, so that the network amplifies the
effects of the intervention.
In the context of sampled network games, one could allocate the budget according to the
network heuristic policy, but this would require perfect knowledge of the realized network
P
[N ]
s .11 Our goal is to design an alternative intervention for sampled network games that
uses information about the generating graphon instead of knowledge of the exact sampled
11We here focus on P
[N ]
s for simplicity, similar arguments could be made for P
[N ]
w .
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network realization. We show that under some assumptions on the graphon and agents
payoffs, such alternative intervention performs comparably well as the network heuristic
suggested in [34] when applied to sampled network games with large N . Inspired by the
findings of [34] we construct the following heuristic.
Definition 8 (Graphon heuristic policy). Consider a network game G [N ](R≥0, U, P [N ]s )
sampled from the graphon W according to the procedure given in Definition 3 and let {ti}Ni=1
be the type of the agents sampled from [0, 1]. Suppose that U is as in (14) with α > 0 and let
ψ1(x) be the normalized (nonnegative) eigenfunction associated with the dominant eigenvalue
of the graphon operator W. We define the graphon heuristic policy βˆ[N ]gh component-wise as
follows
[βˆ
[N ]
gh ]i := β + κ
[N ] · ψ1(ti), (17)
where κ[N ] =
√
C[N ]∑N
j=1(ψ1(t
j))2
is a normalization factor that guarantees that the budget con-
straint is satisfied.
The intuition behind the graphon heuristic policy is simple. Since the central planner does
not know the network P
[N ]
s , it uses the dominant eigenfunction of the graphon W as a
proxy for the dominant eigenvector of P
[N ]
s . In other words, the central planner uses ψ1(t
i)
to compute the intervention for agent i instead of [v
[N ]
1 ]i. We next show that with high
probability the graphon heuristic policy βˆ
[N ]
gh approximates arbitrary well the performance
of the network heuristic policy βˆ
[N ]
nh .
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Theorem 6. Consider a network game G [N ](R≥0, U, P [N ]s ) sampled from the graphon W
according to the procedure given in Definition 3. Suppose that U is as in (14) with 0 < α <
1
λmax(W) and that W is Lipschitz continuous (i.e., satisfies Assumption 4 with Ω = 0). Let
T
[N ]
nh and T
[N ]
gh be the welfare achieved under the intervention βˆ
[N ]
nh and βˆ
[N ]
gh , respectively. Let
(λh, ψh) be the eigenpairs of W ordered such that λmax(W) = λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . . Suppose that
λ1 > λ2 and lim supN→∞
C[N ]
N
< ∞ (i.e., C [N ] = O(N)). Fix any sequence {δN}∞N=1 such
that δN ≤ e−1 and log(N/δN )N → 0. Then, for N large, with probability at least 1− 2δN ,
|T [N ]nh − T [N ]gh | = O
(√
log(N/δN)
N
)
.
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix B and proceeds in three main steps. First,
we show that in linear quadratic games it is possible to upper bound the welfare distance
|T [N ]nh − T [N ]gh | with a quantity that is proportional to the distance of the two interventions
‖βˆ[N ]nh − βˆ[N ]gh ‖. Note that βˆ[N ]nh is related to the dominant eigenfunction of the step function
12Theorem 6 is proven under the assumption that the graphon is Lipschitz continuous. A similar result
for the more general piecewise Lipschitz case can be proven similarly.
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graphon W
[N ]
s associated to P
[N ]
s while βˆ
[N ]
gh is related to the dominant eigenfunction of
W . Our second main observation is that the distance between these two eigenfunctions
can be upper bounded by a quantity that depends on the distance of the operator norms∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ divided by the spectral gap λ1 − λ2. The theorem is then proven by noting
that
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ can be upper bounded as done in Theorem 5.
7. Continuation of Example 2: The location model
In this section we continue our discussion of the location model in Example 2 and study
the equilibria of the graphon game with minmax graphon WMM (as introduced in Example 2
and illustrated on the right in Figure 5) and the corresponding sampled network games. We
assume that for both graphon and sampled network games the payoff functions are linear
quadratic as given in (9), and study the equilibria for different values of α with β = 1. We
also study interventions for sampled network games and compare the performance of the
network heuristic with the graphon heuristic for different number of agents.
7.1. Graphon game
We start our analysis by noticing that the eigenvalues (ordered such that λmax(W) =
λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ λ3 . . .) and eigenfunctions of the minmax graphon operator are known and are
λh :=
1
pi2h2
, ψh(x) :=
√
2 sin(hpix) (18)
for all h ∈ N [33, Section 4.3.1]. Notice that W has an infinite, but countable, number of
nonzero eigenvalues, with an accumulation point at zero. Moreover, λmax(W) = 1pi2 . By
equation (11) in Section 6, a unique Nash equilibrium exists if |α| < 1
λmax(W) = pi
2. We
consider the following two cases.
1) α = 0.5: In this case α > 0 and it follows from Section 6.1.1 that the unique Nash
equilibrium is proportional to the Bonacich centrality function (see [33]). This is
illustrated in the left plot of Figure 6 (blue line).
2) α = −0.5: In this case α < 0. It follows from Section 6.1.2 that s¯ > 0 is an internal
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies formula (13). For this particular case it turns out
that the solution of (13) is strictly positive (see right plot of Figure 6, orange line)
hence this is the unique equilibrium (uniqueness follows by Theorem 2).
We note that the structure of the equilibria in cases 1) and 2) are qualitatively different.
In particular, the equilibrium strategy of agents that are “centrally located” (i.e., agents
whose payoff is affected more by the neighbors actions according to the minmax graphon) is
higher in games of strategic complements and lower in games of strategic substitutes. This
is expected since higher network effects lead to agents increasing their strategies in games of
complements and decreasing their strategies in games of substitutes (because of free riding
effects, see [30, 31]).
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Figure 6: Nash equilibria for a linear quadratic graphon game with graphon WMM, for β = 1 and two
diff rent values of α. The continuous line is the Nash equilibrium of the graphon game: blue for strategic
complements (plot on the left) and orange for strategic substitutes (plot on the right). We additionally
report the step function equilibria of 4 sampled network games with network P
[N ]
w sampled from WMM for
N = 10, 50, 200, 2000 (red, yellow, green, gray), as detailed in Section 7.2. We note that if there were no
network effects then each agent would play max{0, α · 0 + β} = β = 1.
300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000
0
2
4
6
8
di
st
an
ce
10-3 Games with complements: =0.5
weighted matrix
 (log(N/ )/N)1/2
300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000
number of players N
4
6
8
10
12
di
st
an
ce
10-3
0-1 matrix
 (log(N/ )/N)1/2
300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000
0
2
4
6
di
st
an
ce
10-3 Games with substitutes: =-0.5
weighted matrix
 (log(N/ )/N)1/2
300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100 2400 2700 3000
number of players N
2
4
6
8
10
di
st
an
ce
10-3
0-1 matrix
 (log(N/ )/N)1/2
Figure 7: Statistics of the L2([0, 1]) distance between the Nash equilibrium of the graphon game and the
Nash equilibrium of 500 sampled network games as a function of the population size N , for β = 1 and two
different values of α. The top plots show network games with graph P
[N ]
w , the bottom ones with P
[N ]
s .
7.2. Sampled network games: Equilibria
Next, consider network games sampled from the minmax graphon. Single realizations
of the equilibria s¯
[N ]
w are illustrated in Figure 6 for N = 10, 50, 200, 2000. As predicted by
the theory, one can verify that the larger N is the more the graphon equilibrium is a good
approximation of the step function equilibrium in such sampled network games.
A more in depth analysis is reported in Figure 7, which shows the empirical distance
between sampled network and graphon game equilibria as a function of the population size.
For each population size N we constructed 500 different sampled weighted graphs P
[N ]
w by
sampling 500 times N values {ti}Ni=1 uniformly at random from [0, 1] and then sorting them
so that ti ≤ tj if i < j. The corresponding P [N ]s was computed by Bernoulli sampling. For
each of the 500 realizations we computed the corresponding Nash equilibria s¯
[N ]
w/s. Figure 7
shows the whisker plot of ‖s¯[N ]w/s− s¯‖L2 (the box denotes the [25÷75] percentiles, the whiskers
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Figure 8: Left: Mean of the average welfare improvement T
[N ]
opt /T
[N ], T
[N ]
nh /T
[N ], T
[N ]
gh /T
[N ], T
[N ]
hom/T
[N ] com-
puted over 20 sampled network games as a function of the population size N , for β = 1, α = 5 and
C [N ] = 0.01N . Right: Statistics of the ratio
T
[N]
gh
T
[N]
nh
and of the distance |T [N ]nh − T [N ]gh | over the same realiza-
tions.
denote the [0 ÷ 95] percentiles, the horizontal line is the median). We additionally report
the trend of the theoretical upper bound computed in Theorem 5 (up to a multiplicative
constant).13 Note that the minmax graphon satisfies Assumption 4 with Ω = 0 since it is
Lipschitz continuous with constant L = 2 (see Lemma 5 in the Appendix). Consequently,
‖s¯[N ]w/s − s¯‖L2 = O
(√
log(N/δN )
N
)
. In Figure 7, we use δN ≡ δ = 0.05 (constant in N and
consistent with the choice of whiskers) and we report γ
√
log(N/δ)
N
for an arbitrary scaling
factor γ > 0 because we are interested in comparing the asymptotic rate.
7.3. Sampled network games: Interventions
We finally consider interventions for sampled network games using the network and
graphon heuristic policies described in Section 6.2. For our simulations, we use α = 5 < pi2
and set the budget constraint to C [N ] = 0.01N , which corresponds to a 20% increase of
average welfare if the budget is split equally among the agents.14
13Note that for Theorem 5 to hold Assumption 2B) is needed. In this example S(x) = R≥0 is unbounded;
this is however only a technicality since S(x) can be taken as [0, smax] for a suitable value of smax without
loss of generality. One can see from (10) that for games of strategic substitutes since α < 0 and z(x | s) ≥ 0
the strategy of each player must be smaller or equal to β. Hence, one can use smax = β = 1. On the other
hand, for games of strategic complements the largest strategies are played over the complete network. For
any finite N , in this case we have s¯ = β(I − 0.5 1N 1>N1N )−11N = 2 hence one can use smax = 2.
14In fact, if the budget is allocated equally (i.e. βˆi = βˆ for all i), the budget constraint yields
∑
i(β −
βˆ)2 ≤ 0.01N ⇒ (1 − βˆ)2 ≤ 0.01 ⇒ βˆ ≤ 1 + 0.1. Recalling that average welfare is simply 12N ‖s¯‖2 the
welfare with no intervention is T [N ] = 12N ‖(I − αP
[N]
s
N )
−1
1N‖2 and with homogeneous interventions is
T
[N ]
hom =
1
2N ‖1.1(I − αP
[N]
s
N )
−1
1N‖2. Hence T [N ]hom/T [N ] = (1.1)2 = 1.21 leading to a ≈ 20% increase of
welfare.
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Let T [N ] be the average welfare with no interventions (i.e., when βˆi = β for all i) and
T
[N ]
opt , T
[N ]
nh , T
[N ]
gh be the average welfare under the optimal intervention and under the network
and graphon heuristics. For comparison purposes let T
[N ]
hom be the welfare achieved under the
homogeneous budget allocation bˆhom = 1.11N . Figure 8 (left) shows the mean value of the
average welfare improvements for different population sizes, computed over 20 realizations.
The first thing to note is that the homogeneous allocation bˆhom performs worse than both
heuristics. Moreover, the graphon heuristic is a better and better approximation of the
network heuristic as N increases. A more detailed comparison is provided in Figure 8
(right) where statistics of the distance |T [N ]nh − T [N ]gh | and ratio
T
[N ]
gh
T
[N ]
nh
are plotted for different
population sizes.
8. Continuation of Example 1: Community structure
We next consider a generalization of the community model with K communities intro-
duced in Example 1, where we allow each community to interact with different probability.
Specifically, let Q ∈ [0, 1]K×K be a symmetric matrix whose element in position (k, l) denotes
the probability that agents of community k and l are interacting (the graphon in Example 1
corresponds to the special case Q = [ginIK + gout(1K1
>
K − IK)]). Let Ck be the subset of
[0, 1] associated with community k, with |Ck| = wk and
∑
k wk = 1. We consider a graphon
game with SBM graphon
WSBM(x, y) = Qij for all x ∈ Ci, y ∈ Cj
and linear quadratic payoff functions as given in (9). We next study the graphon game
equilibria as well as equilibria and interventions for the corresponding sampled network
games.
8.1. Graphon game
To compute the eigenvalues and eigenfunctions of the SBM graphon operator, we consider
the matrix
E := QD, (19)
where D is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements correspond to the community sizes,
that is Dkk = wk for all k. In the next lemma we show that WSBM and E have the
same eigenvalues and the eigenfunctions of WSBM are piecewise constant over the parti-
tion {Ck}Kk=1, with constant value in each community Ck given by the kth element of the
corresponding eigenvector in E.
Lemma 1 ([33]). Consider a SBM graphon WSBM which is piecewise constant over the
partition {Ck}Kk=1. If (λ, ψ) is an eigenpair of WSBM, then there exists v ∈ RK such that
(λ, v) is an eigenpair of the matrix E ∈ RK×K and
ψ(x) = γvk, for all x ∈ Ck (20)
where γ > 0 is a normalization parameter. Conversely, if (λ, v) is an eigenpair of the matrix
E ∈ RK×K then (λ, ψ) is an eigenpair of WSBM with ψ constructed from v as in (20).
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Figure 9: Left: The SBM graphon described in Section 8.1. The figure at the top is a visualization of
the interactions among the 4 communities (the color and width of the arrows is darker the stronger the
interaction), the plot at the bottom shows the corresponding graphon (with white representing 0 and black
representing 1). Note that community 2 is tightly intra-connected and is tightly inter-connected with
community 1. Communities 3 and 4 are loosely connected with 1 and 2, are not connected to each other.
Community 3 is more intra-connected than community 4. Right: Equilibria of the graphon game (black
lines) and equilibria of sampled network games with sampled graph P
[N ]
s for N = 300 (green) and N = 1200
(yellow).
An immediate consequence of this lemma is that λmax(WSBM) = λmax(E). Together with
equation (11), this implies that we have a unique Nash equilibrium if |α| < 1
λmax(E)
.
The equilibria of a graphon game with graphon WSBM with 4 communities of equal size
[w1, w2, w3, w4] = [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25] and with interaction probabilities
Q =

0.1 0.08 0.05 0.05
0.08 0.8 0.05 0.05
0.05 0.05 0.4 0
0.05 0.05 0 0.1

are illustrated for α = 4 < 1
λmax(E)
(complements) and α = −4 (substitutes) in Figure 9.
Note that because of the community structure, each agent in the same community adopts
the same strategy at equilibrium in the graphon game.
8.2. Sampled network games: Equilibria
Next, we compare the graphon Nash equilibrium with the Nash equilibria of network
games sampled from the SBM graphon with the sampling procedure described in Definition 3.
Single realizations of s¯
[N ]
s are illustrated in Figure 9 for N = 300 and N = 1200. Note that for
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Figure 10: Statistics of the L2([0, 1]) distance between the Nash equilibrium of the graphon game and the
Nash equilibrium of 50 sampled network games as a function of the population size N , for β = 1 and two
different values of α. The top plots show network games with graph P
[N ]
w , the bottom ones with P
[N ]
s .
sampled network games with network P
[N ]
s , it is not true that agents in the same community
adopt the same strategy at equilibrium because of stochasticity in link realizations. Figure
10 shows the empirical distance between sampled network and graphon game equilibria as
a function of the population size N . For the SBM graphon, Assumption 4 holds with L = 0
and Ω = K − 1. Consequently, ‖s¯[N ]w/s − s¯‖L2 = O
((
log(N/δN )
N
)1/4)
. In Figure 10, we used
δN ≡ δ = 0.05 (constant in N and consistent with the choice of whiskers) and we report
γ
(
log(N/δN )
N
)1/4
for an arbitrary scaling factor γ > 0.
8.3. Sampled network games: Interventions
Figure 11 illustrates the welfare obtained using the graphon and the network heuristic
for the graphon in Figure 9. Note that the homogeneous intervention in this example leads
to a 50% improvement with respect to the case without interventions. Both the network
and the graphon heuristic instead lead to an almost 75% improvement. As predicted by the
theory, one can also note that the graphon heuristic approximates the performance of the
network heuristic for large populations. We did not report the optimal allocation for this
example, as problem (15) becomes computationally intractable for large N . An important
thing to note about the graphon heuristic in the case of stochastic block models is that, since
the dominant eigenfunction of WSBM is piecewise constant (by Lemma 1), the corresponding
intervention in each sampled network depends only on the community to which each agent
belongs. As illustrated in Figure 12, this may lead to interventions that are not only more
robust, but also easier to translate into policies.
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Average
Figure 11: Left: Mean of the average welfare improvement T
[N ]
nh /T
[N ], T
[N ]
gh /T
[N ], T
[N ]
hom/T
[N ] computed over
50 sampled network games as a function of the population size N , for β = 1, α = 4 and C [N ] = 0.05N .
Right: Statistics of the distance |T [N ]nh − T [N ]gh | and ratio
T
[N]
gh
T
[N]
nh
over the same realizations.
Figure 12: Interventions for a sampled network of size N = 100 (left) and N = 700 (right).
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9. Incomplete information in sampled network games
So far we have assumed that agents have perfect information about the network P
[N ]
s .15
Since for some applications this assumption may not hold, in this section we generalize
our analysis to sampled network games with incomplete information. As in the previous
section, we consider sampled network games with N agents whose types {ti}Ni=1 are drawn
independently and uniformly at random from [0, 1] (recall that, e.g., in the community
structure model of Example 1 an agent’s type represents his community, while in the location
model of Example 2 an agent’s type is his location in the line segment [0, 1]). Different from
the previous section, we here assume that agents do not have access to the exact structure of
the sampled network P
[N ]
s , but instead each agent i knows the stochastic network formation
process (i.e., the graphon W in our framework) and his own type ti ∈ [0, 1], which determines
the probability W (ti, tj) that he will connect to agent j of (random) type tj. We next define
a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this incomplete information game and show that
it is well approximated by the equilibrium of a graphon game with graphon W as studied
in Section 4.
Note that the strategy b(x) of each agent in an incomplete information sampled network
game specifies the action that the agent will take as a function of his type x. Assuming that
all other agents use the strategy b, the expected payoff of an agent i of type ti = x playing
strategy s(x) ∈ S(x) is given by16
Uexp(s(x) | b) = EN,t−i,links
[
U
(
s(x),
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
[P [N ]s ]ijb(t
j)
)]
(21)
where U is as in (3) and EN,t−i,links denotes the expectation with respect to the number of
players, their types (each agent knows its type ti = x but has no information about the other
agents types t−i := {tj}j 6=i, which are independent from ti) and the link realizations (which
are generated according to Bernoulli random variables with probability {W (ti, tj)}j 6=i). We
define a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium as follows.
Definition 9 (Incomplete information sampled network game). An incomplete in-
formation sampled network game Gin(S, U,W ), is a network game with a random number
N of agents, whose types {ti}Ni=1 are sampled independently and uniformly at random from
[0, 1], that interact according to a network P
[N ]
s sampled from the graphon W according to
15For simplicity in this section we focus on 0-1 adjacency matrices, similar results hold for the weighted
case.
16In this section we define the local aggregate by dividing by N − 1 instead of N to account for the fact
that agent i does not consider itself in the local aggregate. This allows us to obtain exact equivalence of the
graphon game equilibrium and symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in incomplete information sampled
network games with linear quadratic payoffs. With the normalization 1N instead of
1
N−1 the equivalence
would hold asymptotically in N .
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Definition 3.17 Each agent i has information about the graphon W , his own type ti, the
strategy sets S and the payoff function U , while is uninformed about P
[N ]
s and the other
agents types t−i.
Definition 10 (Symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Consider a incomplete infor-
mation sampled network game Gin(S, U,W ). A function b such that b(x) ∈ S(x) for all
x ∈ [0, 1] is a symmetric ε-Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all x ∈ [0, 1]
Uexp(b(x) | b) ≥ Uexp(s˜ | b)− ε for all s˜ ∈ S(x).
The function b is an exact symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if the previous inequality
holds for ε = 0.
Remark 4. Note that a strategy profile in both the graphon game and the incomplete infor-
mation sampled network game is a function that maps x ∈ [0, 1] into a strategy s(x) ∈ S(x).
In the graphon game this function specifies the action of a continuum of agents x ∈ [0, 1] in-
teracting according to the graphon W , in the incomplete information sampled network game
it specifies the action an agent with type x takes if he doesn’t know the type of the other
sampled agents and the realized links.
We start by focusing on the case of scalar linear quadratic games with payoff function
as in (9).
Theorem 7. Consider a linear quadratic game with payoff as in (9). A function s¯ is a
Nash equilibrium of the graphon game G(S, U,W ) if and only if it is a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium for the incomplete information sampled network game Gin(S, U,W ).
Proof:. Let z¯(x) =
∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s¯(y)dy. By definition s¯ is a graphon equilibrium if and only if
for all x ∈ [0, 1], s¯(x) ∈ S(x) and
U(s¯(x), z¯(x)) ≥ U(s(x), z¯(x)) for all s(x) ∈ S(x). (22)
Note that for linear quadratic sampled network games with partial information, the
expected payoff of an agent with type ti = x is
Uexp(s(x) | s¯) = EN,t−i,links
[
−1
2
(s(x))2 +
(
α
1
N − 1
∑
j
[P [N ]s ]ij s¯(t
j) + β
)
s(x)
]
= −1
2
(s(x))2 +
(
αEN,t−i,links
[
1
N − 1
∑
j
[P [N ]s ]ij s¯(t
j)
]
+ β
)
s(x),
= U(s(x), zexp(x))
17The distribution of N does not matter for our results, with the exception of Theorem 8 where we assume
that the support of such distribution is bounded from below by Nmin.
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where we defined zexp(x) := EN,t−i,links
[
1
N−1
∑
j[P
[N ]
s ]ij s¯(t
j)
]
.18 Hence s¯ is a symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if for all x ∈ [0, 1], s¯(x) ∈ S(x) and
U(s¯(x), zexp(x)) ≥ U(s(x), zexp(x)) for all s(x) ∈ S(x). (23)
We conclude the proof by showing that zexp(x) = z¯(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1], proving that
conditions (22) and (23) are equivalent. To this end, note that
zexp(x) = EN,t−i,links
[
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
[P [N ]s ]ij s¯(t
j)
]
= ENEt−i|NE links|t−i,N
[
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
[P [N ]s ]ij s¯(t
j)
]
= ENEt−i|N
[
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
W (x, tj)s¯(tj)
]
(24)
and for any fixed N
Et−i|N
[
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
W (x, tj)s¯(tj)
]
=
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Et−i|N
[
W (x, tj)s¯(tj)
]
=
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Etj
[
W (x, tj)s¯(tj)
]
=
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s¯(y)dy =
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
z¯(x) = z¯(x)
where we used the fact that the {tj}Nj=1 are independent and uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
Hence
zexp(x) = ENEt−i|N
[
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
W (x, tj)s¯(tj)
]
= ENz¯(x) = z¯(x). (25)
Note that zexp(x) does not depend on the distribution of N . 
9.1. Generalization to Lipschitz payoff functions
In the previous subsection we focused on games with linear quadratic payoff functions
and we showed that s¯ is a graphon equilibrium if and only if it is a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium for an incomplete information sampled network game with any number of
agents. We next consider a more general class of payoff functions, satisfying the following
assumption.
Assumption 5. The payoff function U(s, z) is Lipschitz continuous in z uniformly over s,
with constant LU .
18Note that EN,t−i,links
[
1
N−1
∑
j [P
[N ]
s ]ij s¯(t
j)
]
is a function of the type ti = x of agent i since a link
between agent i and j forms (i.e., [P
[N ]
s ]ij = 1) with Bernoulli probability W (t
i, tj) = W (x, tj).
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The expected payoff for an agent of type ti = x in this case is
Uexp(s(x) | b) = EN,t−i,links
[
U
(
s(x),
1
N − 1
∑
j
[P [N ]s ]ijb(t
j)
)]
= Eζb(x) [U (s(x), ζb(x))] ,
(26)
where ζb(x) is a random variable that describes the possible realizations of local aggre-
gate perceived by an agent of type x over different network realizations when all agents
play according to b. Note that, when the strategy b equals a graphon game equilibrium s¯,
Eζs¯(x)[ζs¯(x)] = z¯(x) =
∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s¯(y)dy as shown in (24) and (25). For the payoff functions
considered here however
Uexp(s(x) | s¯) = Eζs¯(x) [U (s(x), ζs¯(x))] 6= U
(
s(x),Eζs¯(x) [ζs¯(x)]
)
= U(s(x), z¯(x)),
since the aggregate enters nonlinearly in the payoff function. Therefore it is not possible to
use the argument of Theorem 7 to conclude that s¯ is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Nonetheless, we show in Lemma 11 (in Appendix B) that ζs¯(x) concentrates around z¯(x)
for large population sizes. Hence, for large populations, U(s(x), z¯(x)) is indeed a good
approximation of Uexp(s(x) | s¯). By exploiting this observation we show in the next theorem
that, under the additional assumption that each agent has access to a lower bound (Nmin)
on the population size in any realized sampled network game, the graphon equilibrium s¯ is
a symmetric ε-Bayesian Nash equilibrium with ε→ 0 as the lower bound on the population
size Nmin →∞.
Theorem 8. Consider an incomplete information sampled network game Gin(S, U,W ) where
S(x) = S for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that all the agents know that the population size N is
sampled from a distribution whose support is lower bounded by Nmin and suppose that As-
sumptions 1, 2B), 3, 4 (with Ω = 0) and 5 hold. Let s¯ be the unique equilibrium of the
corresponding graphon game G(S, U,W ). Then s¯ is a symmetric ε-Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium with
ε = O
√ log(Nmin)
Nmin
 .
10. Conclusion
In this work we introduced the novel class of graphon games for modeling strategic be-
havior in infinite populations while accounting for local heterogeneity. We then showed that
graphon games can be used to approximate strategic behavior in large but finite sampled
network games by interpreting the graphon as a stochastic network formation process. This
statistical interpretation of network games allows for the design of simple intervention poli-
cies that do not require detailed information about the network realization and are robust
to stochastic perturbations. Furthermore, we highlighted the connection between graphon
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equilibria and Bayesian Nash equilibria for sampled network games where agents have in-
complete information about the realized network, but know the generating graphon instead.
We believe that the initial investigation of graphons as a tool to model strategic behavior
presented in this work can be extended in a number of different directions. First, in this
paper we focused on symmetric and dense networks (i.e. undirected networks where the
number of neighbors of each agent scales with the population size N). It should be possible
to derive similar results for more general cases, by exploiting recent progresses in graphon
theory. Second, to derive characterization of interventions, we considered the special class
of linear quadratic graphon games. It would be of interest to consider interventions in the
context of nonlinear network games and to test the performance of these intervention policies
with real-world network data.
Appendices
A. Graphon games: Nash equilibrium as a fixed point of the game operator
In this appendix we derive an equivalent reformulation of the Nash equilibrium of any
graphon game as a fixed point of a suitable operator which we term the game operator. The
analysis of the properties of such a game operator is key to prove the results of Section 4.3
on existence, uniqueness and comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium.
A.1. Reformulation as a fixed point
To derive a fixed point characterization of the Nash equilibrium, we start by considering
any strategy function s ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn). The corresponding local aggregate is
z(x | s) :=
∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s(y)dy
:=

∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s1(y)dy
...∫ 1
0
W (x, y)sn(y)dy
 =
 (Ws1)(x)...
(Wsn)(x)
 =: (Wns)(x),
where Wn : L2([0, 1];Rn) → L2([0, 1];Rn) is defined by applying W component-wise.19
Let us now define an operator B : L2([0, 1];Rn)→ L2([0, 1];Rn) defined point-wise as follows
(Bz)(x) := arg max
s˜∈S(x)
U(s˜, z(x)), (A.1)
where z(x) is any function of L2([0, 1];Rn) (i.e., not necessarily z(x |s)). In words, (Bz)(x) is
the best response of agent x to the fixed local aggregate z(x). Note that, under Assumption 1,
19Note that s(x) ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn) ⇒ z(x | s) ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn). In fact ‖z(x | s)‖2
L2;Rn =
∫ 1
0 ‖z(x | s)‖2dx =∫ 1
0
∑
k[
∫ 1
0 W (x, y)sk(y)dy]
2dx ≤ ∫ 10 ∑k(∫ 10 [W (x, y)]2dy)(∫ 10 [sk(y)]2dy)dx ≤ ∫ 10 ∑k(∫ 10 [sk(y)]2dy)dx = ∑k(∫ 10 [sk(y)]2dy) =∫ 1
0
∑
k[sk(y)]
2dy = ‖s(x)‖2L2;Rn , where we used Cauchy-Schwartz, W (x, y)2 ≤ 1 and Fubini-Tonelli to switch
the sum and integral in the second to last equality.
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such best response operator is well defined since the maximization problem in (A.1) has a
unique solution. The fact that, under the given assumptions, the codomain of the best
response operator B is L2([0, 1];Rn) will be proven in the next section.
We then see that a strategy profile s¯ ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
s¯ = BWns¯, (A.2)
that is, the function s¯ is a fixed point of the composite operator BWn, which we term the
game operator.
A.2. Properties of the game operator
Existence and uniqueness of a fixed point solving (A.2) depend on the properties of the
composite game operator BWn. We start by studying the properties of B and Wn separately.
The following Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 are then used in the proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and 3.
Lemma 2 (Properties of Wn). The following holds:
1. Wn is a linear, continuous, bounded and compact operator;
2. The eigenvalues of Wn coincide (besides the multiplicity) with those of W and are thus
real;
3. |||Wn||| = λmax(W).
Proof:. This lemma is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1 since Wn acts indepen-
dently on each component. We include the proof for completeness.
1. Linear: Consider any f, g ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn) and α, β ∈ R
Wn[αf + βg] := [W[αfk + βgk]]nk=1 = [αWfk + βWgk]nk=1 = αWnf + βWng.
Bounded: Consider any f ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn). For any k ∈ [1, n], fk ∈ L2([0, 1]) and
‖Wfk‖L2 ≤ |||W|||‖fk‖L2 <∞. Then
‖Wnf‖2L2;Rn =
∫ 1
0
‖(Wnf)(x)‖2dx =
∫ 1
0
n∑
k=1
((Wfk)(x))2dx =
n∑
k=1
‖Wfk‖2L2
≤ |||W|||2
n∑
k=1
‖fk‖2L2 = |||W|||2‖f‖2L2;Rn
(A.3)
where we used Fubini-Tonelli in the third and last equality.
Continuous: Implied by the previous points [44, Theorem 3.4.3].
Compact: To this end, it suffices to prove that the image of the closed unit ball
BL2;Rn of L2([0, 1];Rn) under Wn is relatively compact in L2([0, 1];Rn). Note that
Wn(BL2;Rn) ⊆Wn(BL2 × . . .×BL2) = W(BL2)× . . .×W(BL2) since f ∈ BL2;Rn implies
fk ∈ BL2 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence (Wn(BL2;Rn))cl ⊆ (W(BL2))cl× . . .× (W(BL2))cl.
Since W is a compact operator, (W(BL2))cl is compact. Hence (Wn(BL2;Rn))cl is a
closed subset of a compact set and is thus compact.
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2. Take any λ ∈ Λ(Wn). By definition there exists g ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn), g 6= 0 such that
Wng = λg. Hence there exists a component k such that gk 6= 0,Wgk = λgk. Hence λ ∈
Λ(W). Viceversa, take any λ ∈ Λ(W). By definition there exists f ∈ L2([0, 1]), f 6= 0
such that Wf = λf . Consider a vector valued function g such that gk = f for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , n} then Wng = λg, g 6= 0 and thus λ ∈ Λ(Wn).
3. By definition |||Wn||| := sup‖f‖L2;Rn=1 ‖Wnf‖L2;Rn . Note that (A.3) implies |||Wn||| ≤
|||W||| = λmax(W). On the other hand, by taking f = 1√n [ψ1]nk=1 where ψ1 is the nor-
malized dominant eigenfunction of W, one gets ‖f‖L2;Rn = 1, Wnf = 1√n [Wψ1]nk=1 =
λmax(W)√
n
[ψ1]
n
k=1 = λmax(W)f . Hence ‖Wnf‖L2;Rn = λmax(W), implying |||Wn||| ≥
λmax(W).

Lemma 3 (Properties of B). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the following holds:
1. B is a Lipschitz operator. That is, for any f, g ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn),
‖Bf − Bg‖L2;Rn ≤ `U
αU
‖f − g‖L2;Rn ;
2. B is a continuous operator;
3. Suppose further that Assumption 2A) holds, then the codomain of B is L2([0, 1];Rn);
4. Suppose further that Assumption 2B) holds, then the codomain of B is contained in
LS := {f ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn) | ‖f‖L2;Rn ≤ smax}, (A.4)
where smax is as defined in Assumption 2.
Proof:.
1. Take any f, g ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn). For any x ∈ [0, 1] we get
‖(Bf)(x)− (Bg)(x)‖ = ‖ arg max
s˜∈S(x)
U(s˜, f(x))− arg max
s˜∈S(x)
U(s˜, g(x))‖
≤ 1
αU
‖ − ∇sU((Bg)(x), f(x)) +∇sU((Bg)(x), g(x))‖
≤ `U
αU
‖f(x)− g(x)‖.
(A.5)
The first inequality in (A.5) can be proven by reformulating the optimization prob-
lem in (A.1) as the variational inequality VI(S(x),−∇sU(·, z(x))). By Assumption 1,
the operator −∇sU(·, z) is strongly monotone with constant αJ for all z ∈ Rn, [50,
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Equation (12)] . The result then follows from a known bound on the distance of the
solution of strongly monotone variational inequalities [51, Theorem 1.14]. The second
inequality in (A.5) comes from the assumption that ∇sU(s, z) is uniformly Lipschitz
in z with constant `U for all s ∈ Rn. Let us now compute ‖Bf − Bg‖2L2;Rn
‖Bf − Bg‖2L2;Rn =
∫ 1
0
‖(Bf)(x)− (Bg)(x)‖2dx
≤
∫ 1
0
(
`U
αU
)2
‖f(x)− g(x)‖2dx =
(
`U
αU
)2
‖f − g‖2L2;Rn .
2. Lipschitz continuity implies continuity.
3. We need to show that for any z ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn), ‖Bz‖L2;Rn <∞. Consider the function
zˆ(x) := zˆ for all x ∈ [0, 1], where zˆ is as in Assumption 2A). Note that zˆ ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn)
and
‖Bzˆ‖2L2;Rn =
∫ 1
0
‖(Bzˆ)(x)‖2dx =
∫ 1
0
‖ arg max
s˜∈S(x)
U(s˜, zˆ)‖2dx ≤M2.
Consider now any z ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn). We have
‖Bz‖L2;Rn = ‖Bz − Bzˆ + Bzˆ‖L2;Rn ≤ ‖Bz − Bzˆ‖L2;Rn + ‖Bzˆ‖L2;Rn
≤
(
`U
αU
)
‖zˆ − z‖L2;Rn +M ≤
(
`U
αU
)
(‖zˆ‖L2;Rn + ‖z‖L2;Rn) +M <∞,
where the second inequality follows from statement 1).
4. Under Assumption 2B) for any x ∈ [0, 1], (Bz)(x) ∈ S(x) ⊆ S hence
‖Bz‖2L2;Rn =
∫ 1
0
‖(Bz)(x)‖2dx ≤
∫ 1
0
s2maxdx = s
2
max.
Consequently for any z ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn), Bz ∈ LS .

Finally, we study the properties of LS as defined in (A.4).
Lemma 4 (Properties of LS). For any non-empty compact set S ⊂ Rn, the set LS in
(A.4) is a non-empty, convex, closed and bounded subset of L2([0, 1];Rn).
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Proof:. Since S is non-empty and compact smax is well defined. This immediately implies
that LS is non-empty. Given two functions f, g ∈ LS and any µ ∈ [0, 1]
‖µf+(1−µ)g‖L2;Rn ≤ µ‖f(x)‖L2;Rn + (1− µ)‖g(x)‖L2;Rn ≤ µsmax + (1− µ)smax = smax.
Hence µf + (1− µ)g ∈ LS and LS is convex. LS is closed and bounded by definition. 
B. Omitted proofs and auxiliary results
B.1. Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
These facts are well known and are reported here for completeness.
1. Note that
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
|W (x, y)|2dxdy ≤ ∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1dxdy ≤ 1, hence W is a Hilbert-Schmidt
integral operator with Hilbert-Schmidt kernel W . See also [6, Section 7.5].
2. Since W (x, y) is symmetric, W is self-adjoint (see e.g. [44, Example 6.5.9]). The
spectrum of bounded self-adjoint operators is real [44, Theorem 6.6.3]. See also [6,
Section 7.5].
3. For bounded self-adjoint operators it holds |||W||| = r(W), [44, Theorem 6.6.7 ]. Since
W is linear compact and positive (with respect to the total order cone of nonnegative
functions in L2([0, 1])), by Krein-Rutman theorem r(W) > 0 is an eigenvalue [52,
Proposition 7.26]. Since all eigenvalues are real it must be r(W) = λmax(W).
Proof of Theorem 1
We aim at applying Schauder fixed point theorem [53, Theorem 4.1.1] to BWn : LS →
K := (BWn(LS))cl.
1. By Lemma 4, LS is non-empty, convex, closed and bounded.
2. In Lemma 2 and 3 we have proven that both Wn and B are continuous operators,
hence BWn is continuous.
3. We next show K ⊆ LS . Since Wn : LS → L2([0, 1];Rn) and B : L2([0, 1];Rn)→ LS it
holds BWn(LS) ⊆ LS . Since LS is closed, K = (BWn(LS))cl ⊆ (LS)cl = LS .
4. Finally, we show that K is compact. To this end note that Wn is a compact oper-
ator by Lemma 2 and LS is bounded, hence (Wn(LS))cl is compact [44, Definition
7.2.1]. We proved in Lemma 3 that B is Lipschitz (and thus continuous), consequently
B((Wn(LS))cl) is compact [54, Theorem 2.34]. Clearly B(Wn(LS)) ⊆ B((Wn(LS))cl)
and thus K := (B(Wn(LS)))cl ⊆ (B((Wn(LS))cl))cl = B((Wn(LS))cl)). K is thus a
closed subset of a compact set, which implies that K is compact [54, pg. 40].
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Schauder fixed point theorem thus guarantees the existence of a fixed point.
Proof of Theorem 2
We show that under the assumptions of this theorem the game operator is a contraction
(i.e. Lipschitz with constant strictly less than one) in the Hilbert space L2([0, 1];Rn). The
conclusion then follows from Banach fixed point theorem [53, Theorem 4.3.4]. For any
f, g ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn),
‖BWnf − BWng‖L2;Rn ≤ `U
αU
‖Wnf −Wng‖L2;Rn = `U
αU
‖Wn(f − g)‖L2;Rn
≤ `U
αU
|||Wn|||‖f − g‖L2;Rn = `U
αU
λmax(W)‖f − g‖L2;Rn ,
where we used Lemma 3 for the first inequality, the fact that Wn is linear in the first
equality and the fact that |||Wn||| = λmax(W), as proven in Lemma 2, in the last line. The
conclusion follows from Assumption 3.
Proof of Theorem 3
By the equivalent characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of fixed points, it holds
s¯ = BWns¯ and s˜ = BW˜ns˜ hence
‖s¯− s˜‖L2;Rn = ‖BWns¯− BW˜ns˜‖L2;Rn ≤ `U
αU
‖Wns¯− W˜ns˜‖L2;Rn
≤ `U
αU
‖Wns¯−Wns˜‖L2;Rn + `U
αU
‖Wns˜− W˜ns˜‖L2;Rn
≤ `U
αU
|||Wn|||‖s¯− s˜‖L2;Rn + `U
αU
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Wn − W˜n∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣‖s˜‖L2;Rn
=
`U
αU
λmax(W)‖s¯− s˜‖L2;Rn + `U
αU
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W− W˜∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣‖s˜‖L2;Rn
where we used that B is Lipschitz with constant `U
αU
, as proven in Lemma 3, the fact that
|||Wn||| = λmax(W) and the fact that
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Wn − W˜n∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W− W˜∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣. To prove the latter fact
note that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Wn − W˜n∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = sup
f∈L2([0,1];Rn),‖f‖L2;Rn=1
‖(Wn − W˜n)f‖L2;Rn
= sup
f∈L2([0,1];Rn),‖f‖L2;Rn=1
√∑
k
‖(W− W˜)fk‖2L2
≤ sup
f∈L2([0,1];Rn),‖f‖L2;Rn=1
√∑
k
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W− W˜∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2‖fk‖2L2
= sup
f∈L2([0,1];Rn),‖f‖L2;Rn=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(W− W˜)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣‖f‖L2;Rn = ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W− W˜∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣.
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and
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Wn − W˜n∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = sup
f∈L2([0,1];Rn),‖f‖L2;Rn=1
‖(Wn − W˜n)f‖L2;Rn
≥ sup
g∈L2([0,1]),‖g‖L2=1
‖(Wn − W˜n)[g; 0; . . . ; 0]‖L2;Rn
= sup
g∈L2([0,1]),‖g‖L2=1
‖(W− W˜)g‖L2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W− W˜∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣.
The first conclusion follows from the fact that 1− `U/αUλmax(W) > 0 by Assumption 3.
The second conclusion follows by the fact that, under Assumption 2B), ‖s˜‖L2;Rn ≤ smax, as
proven in Lemma 3.
Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose that s¯[N ](x) is a Nash equilibrium of the graphon game with graphonW
[N ]. Since
W [N ] is a step function over the partition U [N ], the aggregate z¯(x) = ∫ 1
0
W [N ](x, y)s¯[N ](y)dy
is a step function with respect to the same partition. Let z¯i be the value of z¯(x) in U [N ]i .
From the definition of Nash equilibrium for the graphon game
s¯[N ](x) = arg max
s∈S[N ](x)
U(s, z¯(x)) = arg max
s∈Si
U(s, z¯i) for all x ∈ U [N ]i .
Consequently, also s¯[N ](x) is a step function with respect to U [N ]. Let s¯i[N ] be the value of
s¯[N ](x) in U [N ]i . Then z¯i =
∫ 1
0
W [N ](x, y)s¯[N ](y)dy =
1
N
∑N
j=1 P
[N ]
ij s¯
j
[N ] and s¯[N ](x) is a Nash
equilibrium of the graphon game if and only if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} it holds
s¯i[N ] = arg max
s∈Si
U(s, z¯i), z¯i =
1
N
N∑
j=1
P
[N ]
ij s¯
j
[N ]
The latter is the definition of Nash equilibrium in the network game with network P [N ], thus
concluding the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5
Let W
[N ]
w and W
[N ]
s be the step function graphons corresponding to P
[N ]
w and P
[N ]
s , re-
spectively, so that s¯
[N ]
w and s¯
[N ]
s are the equilibria of the graphon games played over the
graphon W
[N ]
w and W
[N ]
s . By Theorem 3 it follows
‖s¯[N ]w/s − s¯‖L2;Rn ≤ K˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]w/s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣. (B.1)
The result on ‖s¯[N ]w − s¯‖L2;Rn follows from (B.1) and the fact that for N large enough
with probability at least 1− δN ∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]w −W∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ(N).
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The latter fact is proven in [33, Theorem 1] (reported in Lemma 8 in Appendix B.2) and
follows from the fact that the {ti}Ni=1 are the ordered statistic of N uniform samples from
[0, 1] combined with the fact that W is piecewise Lipschitz by Assumption 4.
The result on ‖s¯[N ]s − s¯‖L2;Rn can be proven in a similar fashion upon noting that by
triangular inequality∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W[N ]w ∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]w −W∣∣∣∣∣∣, (B.2)
and for N large enough with probability 1− δN
∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W[N ]w ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
4 log(2N/δN)
N
, (B.3)
as detailed in [33, Theorem 1] (see Lemma 8). The latter fact holds since the operator
distance between the step function graphons W
[N ]
s and W
[N ]
w can be upper bounded by using
matrix concentration inequalities [55, Theorem 1] applied to the corresponding matrices P
[N ]
s
and P
[N ]
w (recall that P
[N ]
w = E[P [N ]s ]).
Overall, there exists M > 0 such that for N sufficiently large with probability at least
1− 2δN it holds
‖s¯[N ]w/s − s¯‖L2;Rn ≤M
(
log(N/δN)
N
) 1
4
.
To prove almost sure convergence, let us define the infinite sequence of events
EN :=
{
‖s¯[N ]w/s − s¯‖L2;Rn > M
(
log(N/δN)
N
) 1
4
}
.
It follows that Pr [EN ] < 2δN . Set δN = 1N2 (which satisfies the assumption of the theorem)
then ∑∞
N=1 Pr [EN ] <
∑∞
N=1
2
N2
<∞.
By Borel-Cantelli lemma there exists a positive integer N¯ such that for all N ≥ N¯ ,
the complement of EN , i.e., ‖s¯[N ]w/s − s¯‖L2;Rn ≤ M
(
log(N3)
N
) 1
4
, holds almost surely. Since(
3 log(N)
N
) 1
4 → 0 we obtain ‖s¯[N ]w/s − s¯‖L2;Rn → 0 almost surely.
Proof of Theorem 6
Let s¯nh/gh be the Nash equilibrium achieved in the sampled network game under the
two interventions βˆ
[N ]
nh/gh and let Ms := max{‖s¯nh‖, ‖s¯gh‖}. First, note that s¯nh/gh = (IN −
αP
[N ]
s
N
)−1βˆ[N ]nh/gh hence
Ms = max{‖s¯nh‖, ‖s¯gh‖} ≤ ‖(IN − αP
[N ]
s
N
)−1‖ ·max{‖βˆ[N ]nh ‖, ‖βˆ[N ]gh ‖}
≤ ‖(IN − αP
[N ]
s
N
)−1‖ · (
√
C [N ] + β
√
N),
(B.4)
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where the last inequality is implied by the budget constraint.
Second, note that for any vector a, b it holds
|‖a‖2 − ‖b‖2| ≤ ‖a− b‖(‖a− b‖+ 2 max{‖a‖, ‖b‖}).
From the previous inequality and from T [N ] = 1
2N
‖s¯‖2 it follows that
|T [N ]nh − T [N ]gh | =
1
2N
|‖s¯nh‖2 − ‖s¯gh‖2| ≤ 12N ‖s¯nh − s¯gh‖(‖s¯nh − s¯gh‖+ 2 max{‖s¯nh‖, ‖s¯nh‖}))
≤ 1
2N
‖s¯nh − s¯gh‖(2Ms + 2Ms) = 2MsN ‖s¯nh − s¯gh‖
= 2Ms
N
‖[I − αP [N ]s
N
]−1βˆ[N ]nh − [I − αP
[N ]
s
N
]−1βˆ[N ]gh ‖
≤ 2Ms
N
‖[I − αP [N ]s
N
]−1‖‖βˆ[N ]nh − βˆ[N ]gh ‖
≤ 2‖[I − αP [N ]s
N
]−1‖2 (
√
C[N ]+β
√
N)
N
‖βˆ[N ]nh − βˆ[N ]gh ‖.
(B.5)
It follows by Lemma 10 (given in Appendix B.2) that with probability 1− 2δN for N large
1. |λmax
(
P
[N ]
s
N
)
− λ1| = O
(√
log(N/δN )
N
)
2. ‖βˆ[N ]nh − βˆ[N ]gh ‖ =
√
C [N ]O
(√
log(N/δN )
N
)
We first prove that condition 1 implies that ‖[I − αP [N ]s
N
]−1‖ = O(1). To this end, fix
k¯ ∈ (1, 1
αλ1
) (this interval has non empty interior by assumption). If |λmax
(
P
[N ]
s
N
)
− λ1| =
O
(√
log(N/δN )
N
)
, for N large enough, λmax
(
P
[N ]
s
N
)
≤ k¯λ1 for any 1 < k¯ < 1αλ1 and
‖(IN − αP
[N ]
s
N
)−1‖ = ‖∑∞k=0 αk (P [N ]sN )k ‖ ≤∑∞k=0 αkλmax (P [N ]sN )k = 1
1−αλmax
(
P
[N ]
s
N
) ≤ 1
1−αk¯λ1 .
(B.6)
The term on the right hand side of (B.6) is positive because 1− αk¯λ1 > 0 by construction
and does not depend on N .
Hence, (B.5) and conditions 1 and 2 above guarantee that with probability 1 − 2δN for
N large
|T [N ]nh − T [N ]gh | ≤ O(1) ·
(
√
C [N ] + β
√
N)
√
C [N ]
N
· O
(√
log(N/δN)
N
)
.
The conclusion follows since
√
C [N ] = O(√N).
Proof of Theorem 8
It follows from the definition of graphon equilibrium that for all x ∈ [0, 1]
U(s¯(x), z¯(x)) ≥ U(s(x), z¯(x), ∀s(x) ∈ S,
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where z¯(x) =
∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s¯(y)dy. Consider an agent of type ti. By the previous inequality
specialized for x = ti, it follows that for all s(ti) ∈ S
Uexp(s¯(t
i) | s¯) = Eζs¯(ti)[U(s¯(ti), ζs¯(ti))] = Eζs¯(ti)[U(s¯(ti), ζs¯(ti))− U(s¯(ti), z¯(ti))] + U(s¯(ti), z¯(ti))
≥ −LUEζs¯(ti)[‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖] + U(s(ti), z¯(ti))
= −LUEζs¯(ti)[‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖] + Eζs¯(ti)[U(s(ti), z¯(ti))− U(s(ti), ζs¯(ti))]
+Eζs¯(ti)[U(s(t
i), ζs¯(t
i))]
≥ −2LUEζs¯(ti)[‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖] + Eζs¯(ti)[U(s(ti), ζs¯(ti))] =: −ε+ Uexp(s(ti) | s¯).
The proof is concluded upon showing that ε := 2LUEζs¯(ti)[‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖] = O
(√
log(Nmin)
Nmin
)
.
Since z¯(ti) = Eζs¯(ti)[ζs¯(ti)], we need to show that ζs¯(ti) concentrates around its mean when
Nmin → ∞. We show in Lemma 11 (given in Appendix B.2) that for any fixed population
of size N and any fixed ti with probability at least 1 − 2n+1√
N−1 it holds ‖ζs¯(ti) − z¯(ti)‖ ≤ ε′,
with ε′ := O
(√
log(N−1)
N−1
)
. It follows that
Eζs¯(ti)|N [‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖] ≤
(
1− 2n+ 1√
N − 1
)
ε′ +
2n+ 1√
N − 12smax
≤ ε′ + 2(2n+ 1)smax√
N − 1 = O
(√
log(N − 1)
N − 1
)
,
where we used that ‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖ ≤ 2smax for all realizations by Assumption 2B). Conse-
quently, if N > Nmin
Eζs¯(ti)[‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖] = ENEζs¯(ti)|N [‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖] = O
√ log(Nmin)
Nmin
 .
B.2. Auxiliary results
We report here some auxiliary lemmas needed to prove our main results. Specifically,
- Lemma 5 proves that the minmax graphon satisfies Assumption 4;
- Lemma 6 derives sufficient conditions for the equilibrium of a graphon game to be
Lipschitz continuous;
- Lemma 7 provides an auxiliary result on ordered statistics and is proven in [33]. Ap-
plied to our context, this result states that if the agents types {ti}Ni=1 are sampled
independently and uniformly at random from [0, 1] then for N sufficiently large with
probability 1−δN the type ti of the ith agent is not more than dN far from the interval
U [N ]i ;
43
- Lemma 8 provides bounds for
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]w −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ that hold with high
probability. This lemma is key to the proofs of Theorem 5 and 6 and is proven in [33];
- Lemma 9 provides bounds on the distance between the dominant eigenvalues and
eigenfunctions of W[N ]s and W in terms of the distance of the operators
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣;
- Lemma 10 uses Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 to bound the distance of the network heuristic
and graphon heuristic, ‖βˆ[N ]nh − βˆ[N ]gh ‖, and is key to the proof of Theorem 6.
- Lemma 11 provides a concentration result for the local aggregate in incomplete infor-
mation sampled network games.
Lemma 5. For the minmax graphon WMM(x, y) = min(x, y)(1−max(x, y)) it holds
|WMM(x, y)−WMM(x′, y′)| ≤ 2 (|x− x′|+ |y − y′|)
for any x, x′, y, y′ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof:. Firstly we prove that min(x, y) is Lipschitz continuous with constant 1. To this end
note that 2 min(x, y) = x+ y − |x− y|. Hence
2|min(x, y)−min(x′, y′)| = |x− x′ + y − y′ − |x− y|+ |x′ − y′||
≤ |x− x′|+ |y − y′|+ | − |x− y|+ |x′ − y′||
≤ |x− x′|+ |y − y′|+ | − x+ y + x′ − y′| ≤ 2(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|),
where we used ||a| − |b|| ≤ |a − b|. Similarly, it can be proven that (1 − max(x, y)) is
Lipschitz continuous with constant 1. Finally,
|WMM(x, y)−WMM(x′, y′)| = |min(x, y)(1−max(x, y))−min(x′, y′)(1−max(x′, y′))|
≤ |min(x, y)(1−max(x, y))−min(x′, y′)(1−max(x, y))|
+ |min(x′, y′)(1−max(x, y))−min(x′, y′)(1−max(x′, y′))|
≤ |min(x, y)−min(x′, y′)||1−max(x, y)|+ |min(x′, y′)||(1−max(x, y))− (1−max(x′, y′))|
≤ |min(x, y)−min(x′, y′)|+ |(1−max(x, y))− (1−max(x′, y′))| ≤ 2(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|).

Lemma 6. Consider a graphon game satisfying Assumptions 1, 2B), 3 and 4 with Ω = 0
and suppose that S(x) = S for all x. Then the unique graphon equilibrium is Lipschitz
continuous with constant Ls =
`ULsmax
αU
.
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Proof:. Let s¯ be the unique graphon equilibrium and z¯ =
∫ 1
0
W (x, y)s¯(y)dy. For any x1, x2 ∈
[0, 1] it holds
‖s¯(x1)− s¯(x2)‖ = ‖ arg max
s∈S
U(s, z¯(x1))− arg max
s∈S
U(s, z¯(x2))‖
≤ 1
αU
‖∇sU(s¯(x1), z¯(x1))−∇sU(s¯(x1), z¯(x2))‖ ≤ `U
αU
‖z¯(x1)− z¯(x2)‖.
(B.7)
Moreover,
‖z¯(x1)− z¯(x2)‖ = ‖
∫ 1
0
W (x1, y)s¯(y)dy −
∫ 1
0
W (x2, y)s¯(y)dy‖
≤
∫ 1
0
|W (x1, y)−W (x2, y)|‖s¯(y)‖dy
≤
∫ 1
0
L|x1 − x2|smaxdy = L|x1 − x2|smax.
(B.8)
Combining (B.7) and (B.8) yields
‖s¯(x1)− s¯(x2)‖ ≤ `ULsmax
αU
|x1 − x2|.

Lemma 7 ([33]). Let {ti}Ni=1 be the ordered statistics of N random samples from U [0, 1].
For any δN ∈ (Ne−N/5, e−1) and N large, with probability at least 1− δN it holds
|ti − x| ≤ dN for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and any x ∈ U [N ]i = [ i−1N , iN ). (B.9)
where dN :=
1
N
+
√
8 log(N/δN )
N
→ 0.
Lemma 8 ([33]). Consider a graphon W satisfying Assumption 4. Let W
[N ]
w/s be the step
function graphons corresponding to the matrices P
[N ]
w/s, as defined in Section 3.3. Fix any
sequence {δN}∞N=1 such that δN ≤ e−1 and log(N/δN )N → 0. Then, for N large enough,
1. with probability at least 1− δN , (B.9) holds and∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]w −W∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ(N) := 2√(L2 − Ω2)d2N + ΩdN ;
2. with probability at least 1− 2δN , (B.9) holds and
∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ(N) +
√
4 log(2N/δN)
N
. (B.10)
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Proof:. Note that for N large enough the condition δN ∈ (Ne−N/5, e−1) is satisfied under
the assumptions of this lemma. In fact, if δN ≤ Ne−N/5 infinitely often then log(N/δN )N ≥
log(N/N ·eN/5)
N
= 1
5
infinitely often and the assumption log(N/δN )
N
→ 0 would be violated. Hence
Lemma 7 applies and the result for piecewise Lipschitz graphons follows from [33, Theorem
1]. We here report a simplified proof for Lipschitz continuous graphons (for the case Ω = 0).
1. Consider any f ∈ L2([0, 1]) such that ‖f‖L2 = 1. Let D(x, y) := W [N ]w (x, y)−W (x, y).
Then with probability 1− δN (independent of f)
‖W[N ]w f −Wf‖2L2 =
∫ 1
0
(W[N ]w f −Wf)(x)2dx =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
D(x, y)f(y)dy
)2
dx
≤
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
D(x, y)2dy
)(∫ 1
0
f(y)2dy
)
dx
=
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
D(x, y)2dy
)
‖f‖2L2dx
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
D(x, y)2dydx
=
∑
i
∑
j
∫
U [N ]i
∫
U [N ]j
(W [N ]w (x, y)−W (x, y))2dydx
=
∑
i
∑
j
∫
U [N ]i
∫
U [N ]j
(W (ti, tj)−W (x, y))2dydx
≤ L2
∑
i
∑
j
∫
U [N ]i
∫
U [N ]j
(|ti − x|+ |tj − y|))2dydx
≤ L2
∑
i
∑
j
∫
U [N ]i
∫
U [N ]j
(2dN)
2dydx = (2LdN)
2
where we used (B.9) from Lemma 7 in the last inequality. Hence with probability
1− δN , (B.9) holds and∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]w −W∣∣∣∣∣∣ = sup
f∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1
‖W[N ]w f −Wf‖L2 ≤ 2LdN .
2. The operator W[N ]s −W[N ]w can be seen as the graphon operator of an SBM graphon
with matrix P
[N ]
s −P [N ]w over the uniform partion {U [N ]i }Ni=1. Note that for any graphon
operator A over such partition (i.e. A(x, y) = Aij for x ∈ U [N ]i , y ∈ U [N ]i ) it holds
|||A||| ≤ 1
N
‖A‖. In fact,
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|||A|||2 = supf∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1 ‖Af‖2L2
= supf∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
A(x, y)f(y)dy
)2
dx
= supf∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1
∑
i
∫
U [N ]i
(∑
j
∫
U [N ]j
A(x, y)f(y)dy
)2
dx
= supf∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1
∑
i
∫
U [N ]i
(∑
j Aij
∫
U [N ]j
f(y)dy
)2
dx
= supf∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1
∑
i
∫
U [N ]i
(∑
j Aijvj
)2
dx
= supf∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1
∑
i
∫
U [N ]i
[Av]2i dx
= 1
N
supf∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1
∑
i[Av]
2
i =
1
N
supf∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1 ‖Av‖2
≤ 1
N
‖A‖2 sup
f∈L2([0,1])s.t.‖f‖L2=1
‖v‖2 ≤ 1
N2
‖A‖2.
where we set vj :=
∫
U [N ]j
f(y)dy and used ‖v‖2 ≤ 1
N
(since ‖v‖2 = ∑j v2j = ∑j(∫Uj 1 ·
f(y)dy)2 ≤∑j(∫Uj 12dy)(∫Uj f(y)2dy) = 1N ∑j ∫Uj f(y)2dy = 1N ∫ 10 f(y)2dy = 1N ‖f‖2L2 =
1
N
).
Consequently, ∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W[N ]w ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1N ‖P [N ]s − P [N ]w ‖.
Recall that P
[N ]
w = E[P [N ]s ], hence we can bound the term on the right hand side by
employing matrix concentration inequalities.
The maximum expected degree CdN := maxi(
∑N
j=1[P
[N ]
w ]ij) grows as order N . Hence
for N large enough, it is greater than 4
9
log(2N
δN
) since log(N/δN )
N
→ 0 by assumption.
Consequently, all the conditions of [55, Theorem 1] are met and with probability 1−δN
∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W[N ]w ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1N ‖P [N ]s − P [N ]w ‖ ≤ 1N
√
4CdN log(2N/δN) ≤
√
4 log(2N/δN)
N
,
where we used that CdN ≤ N since each element in P [N ]w belongs to [0, 1]. Using the
fact that ∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W[N ]w ∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]w −W∣∣∣∣∣∣
and the first statement concludes the proof.

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Lemma 9. Consider a graphon W with eigenvalues λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . and a matrix P [N ]s
constructed from W as in Definition 3. Let W
[N ]
s be the step function graphon corresponding
to P
[N ]
s and ψ, ψv be the dominant eigenfunctions of W and W[N ]s , respectively. Then the
following statements hold
1.
|λmax
(
P
[N ]
s
N
)
− λ1| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣;
2. if λ1 > λ2, there exists 0 < M <∞ such that
‖ψv − ψ‖L2 ≤M
∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣.
Proof:. We prove the two statements separately.
1. By Proposition 1 and Lemma 1,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = λmax(W[N ]s ) = λmax (P [N ]sN ) and |||W||| = λ1.
Hence
• λ1 = |||W||| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣−W[N ]s +W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = λmax (P [N ]sN )+ ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
• λmax
(
P
[N ]
s
N
)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |||W|||+ ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = λ1 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
which implies |λmax
(
P
[N ]
s
N
)
− λ1| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣.
2. Since ψv is the dominant eigenfunction of W[N ]s and ψ is the dominant eigenfunction
of W, the result follows by Davis-Kahan theorem [56]. We report here a simpler proof
tailored to our setting. Let A := W, B := W[N ]s and P := W[N ]s −W so that B = A+P.
Let {λA/Bi }∞i=1 and {ψA/Bi }∞i=1 be the ordered eigenvalues and normalized eigenfunctions
of A and B respectively. Let δ := λA1 − λA2 . We aim at showing that
‖ψA1 − ψB1 ‖L2 ≤
2
√
2|||P|||
δ
.
To this end, recall that by the spectral theorem {ψAi }∞i=1 is an orthonormal basis and
let ci := 〈ψB1 , ψAi 〉 be the coefficients of ψB1 in this basis. We proceed in three steps.
(a) We start by noting that
‖ψA1 − ψB1 ‖2L2 ≤ 2(1− c21). (B.11)
In fact
‖ψA1 − ψB1 ‖2L2 = ‖ψA1 ‖2L2 + ‖ψB1 ‖2L2 − 2c1 = 2(1− c1) ≤ 2(1− c21)
since 0 ≤ c1 ≤ 1 (the fact that c1 ≥ 0 follows from A and B being positive
operators (in the cone of nonnegative functions) which implies that their dominant
eigenfunctions are nonnegative, c1 ≤ 1 follows from Cauchy-Schwartz).
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(b) We next show that
(1− c21) ≤
‖AψB1 − λA1 ψB1 ‖2L2
δ2
. (B.12)
To this end note that ψB1 =
∑∞
i=1 ciψ
A
i and
AψB1 − λA1 ψB1 =
∞∑
i=1
ciAψAi − λA1
∞∑
i=1
ciψ
A
i =
∞∑
i=1
ciλ
A
i ψ
A
i − λA1
∞∑
i=1
ciψ
A
i
=
∞∑
i=1
ci(λ
A
i − λA1 )ψAi =
∑
i 6=1
ci(λ
A
i − λA1 )ψAi
hence
‖AψB1 − λB1 ψB1 ‖2L2 = ‖
∑
i 6=1
ci(λ
A
i − λA1 )ψAi ‖2L2 =
∑
i 6=1
c2i (λ
A
1 − λAi )2
≥
∑
i 6=1
c2i (λ
A
1 − λA2 )2 = δ2
∑
i 6=1
c2i = δ
2(1− c21),
where we used ‖ψB1 ‖2L2 =
∑
i c
2
i = 1.
(c) Finally, we show that
‖AψB1 − λA1 ψB1 ‖L2 ≤ 2|||P|||. (B.13)
To this end note that
‖AψB1 − λA1 ψB1 ‖L2 = ‖(B− P)ψB1 − λA1 ψB1 ‖L2 = ‖BψB1 − PψB1 − λA1 ψB1 ‖L2
= ‖λB1 ψB1 − PψB1 − λA1 ψB1 ‖L2 = ‖(λB1 − λA1 )ψB1 − PψB1 ‖L2
≤ ‖(λB1 − λA1 )ψB1 ‖L2 + ‖PψB1 ‖L2 ≤ |λB1 − λA1 |‖ψB1 ‖L2 + |||P|||‖ψB1 ‖L2
= |λB1 − λA1 |+ |||P||| ≤ 2|||P|||
where we used ‖ψB1 ‖L2 = 1 and |λB1 − λA1 | ≤ |||P||| (as shown in the proof of part
1 of this lemma).
Combining (B.11),(B.12) and (B.13) yields
‖ψv − ψ‖L2 ≤
2
√
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣W[N ]s −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|λ1 − λ2| .

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Lemma 10. Under the assumptions of Theorem 6, with probability 1 − 2δN , for N large
enough it holds
1.
|λmax
(
P
[N ]
s
N
)
− λ1| = O
(√
log(N/δN)
N
)
.
2.
‖βˆ[N ]nh − βˆ[N ]gh ‖ =
√
C [N ]O
(√
log(N/δN)
N
)
.
Proof:. Let v ∈ RN≥0 be the dominant eigenvector of P [N ]s , ψ(x) be the dominant eigenfunc-
tion of W, w ∈ RN≥0 be defined component-wise as wi = ψ(ti) and w˜ = w/‖w‖. Then
‖βˆ[N ]nh − βˆ[N ]gh ‖ = ‖β1N +
√
C [N ]v − β1N −
√
C [N ]w˜‖ =
√
C [N ]‖v − w˜‖. (B.14)
Let ψv, ψw be two piecewise constant functions defined as follows
ψv(x) =
√
Nvi, ψw(x) = wi = ψ(t
i), ∀x ∈ U [N ]i ,
where {U [N ]i }Ni=1 is the uniform partition of [0, 1]. The normalization in ψv(x) is chosen such
that
‖ψv‖2L2 =
∫ 1
0
ψv(x)
2dx =
N∑
i=1
∫
U [N ]i
ψv(x)
2dx =
N∑
i=1
∫
U [N ]i
Nv2i dx =
N∑
i=1
v2i = ‖v‖2 = 1.
Similarly,
‖w‖2 =
N∑
i=1
w2i = N
N∑
i=1
∫
U [N ]i
w2i dx = N
N∑
i=1
∫
U [N ]i
ψw(x)
2dx = N‖ψw‖2L2 . (B.15)
The key idea of this proof is to relate ‖v− w˜‖ in (B.14) to ‖ψv−ψw‖L2 and then provide
bounds for the latter. To this end, note that
‖v − w˜‖2 =
∑
i
(vi − w˜i)2 =
∑
i
N
∫
U [N ]i
(vi − w˜i)2dx
=
∑
i
N
∫
U [N ]i
(
ψv(x)√
N
− ψw(x)‖w‖
)2
dx =
∑
i
∫
U [N ]i
(
ψv(x)− ψw(x)‖w‖/√N
)2
dx
≤ 2
∑
i
∫
U [N ]i
(ψv(x)− ψw(x))2 dx+ 2
∑
i
∫
U [N ]i
(
ψw(x)− ψw(x)‖ψw‖L2
)2
dx,
= 2‖ψv − ψw‖2L2 + 2
(
1− 1‖ψw‖L2
)2
‖ψw‖2L2 = 2 ‖ψv − ψw‖2L2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(term A)2
+2 (‖ψw‖L2 − 1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(term B)2
,
(B.16)
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where the first inequality follows from (B.15) and the fact that for all a, b, c ∈ R it holds
(a− b)2 ≤ 2(a− c)2 + 2(c− b)2. We now study terms A and B, separately.
We start by noting that under the given assumptions ψ(x) is Lipschitz continuous since
|ψ(x1)− ψ(x2)| = λ1|
∫ 1
0
(W (x1, y)−W (x2, y))ψ(y)dy|
≤ λ1
√∫ 1
0
(W (x1, y)−W (x2, y))2dy ‖ψ‖L2
≤ λ1
√∫ 1
0
L2|x1 − x2|2dy ‖ψ‖L2 = λ1L‖ψ‖L2|x1 − x2| =: Lψ|x1 − x2|
where Lψ < ∞ since ‖ψ‖L2 is bounded by definition of eigenfunction. Moreover, Lemma 8
and 9 guarantee that forN large enough, with probability 1−2δN , (B.9) holds, |λmax
(
P
[N ]
s
N
)
−
λ1| = O
(√
log(N/δN )
N
)
(proving the first statement) and ‖ψv − ψ‖L2 = O
(√
log(N/δN )
N
)
.
It then follows by (B.9) that with probability 1− 2δN
‖ψw − ψ‖L2 =
√∫ 1
0
(ψw(x)− ψ(x))2dx =
√√√√ N∑
i=1
∫
U [N ]i
(ψ(ti)− ψ(x))2dx
≤
√√√√ N∑
i=1
∫
U [N ]i
L2ψ(t
i − x)2dx ≤
√√√√ N∑
i=1
L2ψd
2
N
1
N
= LψdN
(B.17)
where dN =
1
N
+
√
8 log(N/δN )
N
= O
(√
log(N/δN )
N
)
and thus
term A = ‖ψw − ψv‖L2 ≤ ‖ψw − ψ‖L2 + ‖ψ − ψv‖L2 = O
(√
log(N/δN)
N
)
.
To study term B, recall that ‖ψ‖L2 = 1. By using (B.17) it then follows
term B = |‖ψw‖L2 − 1| = |‖ψw‖L2 − ‖ψ‖L2| ≤ ‖ψw − ψ‖L2 ≤ LψdN = O
(√
log(N/δN)
N
)
.
Using the upper bounds for terms A and B in (B.16), yields ‖v− w˜‖ = O
(√
log(N/δN )
N
)
and
by (B.14) ‖βˆ[N ]nh − βˆ[N ]gh ‖ =
√
C [N ]O
(√
log(N/δN )
N
)
. 
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Lemma 11. Suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 8 hold. Consider a fixed population
size N , a fixed ti ∈ [0, 1] and let ζs¯(ti) be a realization of 1N−1
∑
j[P
[N ]
s ]ij s¯(t
j), where [P
[N ]
s ]
is sampled from the graphon W according to Definition 3. Then with probability at least
1− 2n+1√
N−1 it holds ‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖ ≤ ε′, with ε′ := O
(√
log(N−1)
N−1
)
.
Proof:. Let t−i be the types of all the agents except for agent i. For each realization of t−i
we have
‖ζs¯(ti)− z¯(ti)‖ = ‖ 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
[P [N ]s ]ij s¯(t
j)− z¯(ti)‖
= ‖ 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
(
[P [N ]s ]ij s¯(t
j)−W (ti, tj)s¯(tj) +W (ti, tj)s¯(tj))− z¯(ti)‖
≤ ‖ 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
([P [N ]s ]ij −W (ti, tj))s¯(tj)‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
+ ‖ 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
W (ti, tj)s¯(tj)− z¯(ti)‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
.
We can bound the two terms separately.
• Term 1: Note that ∑j 6=i([P [N ]s ]ij −W (ti, tj))s¯(tj) ∈ Rn. For each h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we
denote by Sh :=
∑
j 6=i([P
[N ]
s ]ij −W (ti, tj))s¯h(tj) the h-th component of the previous
vector and analyze each component separately.
Let Xhj = ([P
[N ]
s ]ij −W (ti, tj))s¯h(tj) and note that for a fixed h the random variables
{Xhj }j 6=i are independent, zero mean and −smax ≤ Xhj ≤ smax for all j 6= i. Moreover,
by definition Sh =
∑
j 6=iX
h
j . Note that E[Sh] = 0. The Hoeffding’s inequality then
yields
Pr
[
|Sh|
N − 1 > smax
√
log(N − 1)
N − 1
]
= Pr
[
|Sh| > smax
√
log(N − 1)(N − 1)
]
< 2 exp
(
−2s
2
max log(N − 1)(N − 1)
(N − 1)(2smax)2
)
= 2 exp
(
− log(N − 1)
2
)
=
2√
N − 1 .
Hence for any h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with probability at least 1 − 2√
N−1 , it holds
|Sh|
N−1 =
O
(√
log(N−1)
N−1
)
. By the union bound, with probability at least 1 − 2n√
N−1 , it holds
|Sh|
N−1 = O
(√
log(N−1)
N−1
)
for all h ∈ {1, . . . , n}. With the same probability
[term 1] =
√√√√ n∑
h=1
(
Sh
N − 1
)2
= O
(√
log(N − 1)
N − 1
)
.
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• Term 2:
Define δN and dN as in Theorem 5. Let {t−i(k)}N−1k=1 be the ordered statistics of {tj}j 6=i
so that t−i(1) ≤ . . . ≤ t−i(N−1). By [33, Proposition 3] (see also Lemma 7) the set of
realizations of {tj}j 6=i such that |t−i(k) − y| ≤ dN−1 for all y ∈ U [N−1]k := [ k−1N−1 , kN−1) and
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} has measure at least 1 − δN−1. Consequently, with this
probability it holds
[term 2] = ‖ 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
W (ti, tj)s¯(tj)− z¯(ti)‖ = ‖ 1
N − 1
N−1∑
k=1
W (ti, t−i(k))s¯(t
−i
(k))− z¯(ti)‖
= ‖ 1
N − 1
N−1∑
k=1
W (ti, t−i(k))s¯(t
−i
(k))−
N−1∑
k=1
∫
U [N−1]k
W (ti, y)s¯(y)dy‖
= ‖
N−1∑
k=1
∫
U [N−1]k
[W (ti, t−i(k))s¯(t
−i
(k))−W (ti, y)s¯(y)]dy‖
≤
N−1∑
k=1
∫
U [N−1]k
‖W (ti, t−i(k))s¯(t−i(k))−W (ti, t−i(k))s¯(y)‖+ ‖W (ti, t−i(k))s¯(y)−W (ti, y)s¯(y)‖dy
≤
N−1∑
k=1
∫
U [N−1]k
(Ls + Lsmax)|t−i(k) − y|dy ≤ (Ls + Lsmax)dN−1,
where the second to last inequality follows from the fact that, under the given assump-
tions, s¯ is Lipschitz continuous with constant Ls (see Lemma 6), ‖s¯‖ ≤ smax and W
is Lipschitz continuous with constant L. By selecting δN−1 = 1N−1 with probability at
least 1− 1
N−1 , [term 2]= O(dN−1) = O
(√
log(N−1)
N−1
)
.
By the union bound with probability at least 1− 2n+1√
N−1 it holds ‖ζs¯(ti)−z¯(ti)‖ = O
(√
log(N−1)
N−1
)
.

C. Additional results
We report here results that are omitted from the main text for simplicity of exposition.
Specifically, Section C.1 presents some known relations of graphs and graphons. These
properties are used in Section C.2 and C.3, where we present novel results on the limit of a
sequence of network games and on the equilibria of network games sampled from graphons
that are not piecewise Lipschitz continuous.
C.1. Relation between graphs and graphons
In this section we summarize some known relations between graphs and graphons, see
for example [6]. To this end, let us denote by W˜ the space of graphons and let ‖W‖ be
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the cut norm of a graphon W ∈ W˜ , which is defined as follows
‖W‖ := sup
M,T⊆[0,1]
∣∣∣ ∫
M
∫
T
W (x, y)dxdy
∣∣∣,
where M and T are measurable subsets of [0, 1]. The cut metric between two graphons
V,W ∈ W˜ is given by
d(W,V ) := inf
φ∈Π[0,1]
‖W φ − V ‖,
where W φ(x, y) := W (φ(x), φ(y)) and Π[0,1] is the class of measure preserving bijections
φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. Intuitively, the function φ performs a relabeling to find the best match
between W and V . Because of such relabeling, d(W,V ) is not a well defined metric in W˜ .
In fact, it might happen that d(W,V ) = 0 even though W 6= V . To avoid such a problem,
we define the space W where we identify graphons up to measure preserving bijections, so
that d is a well defined metric in W . Intuitively, this means that we consider graphs and
graphons with unlabeled nodes. With slight abuse of notation, given a graphon W and a
graph P [N ], we write d(W,P
[N ]) to denote the cut metric d(W,W
[N ]) between the graphon
W and the step function graphon W [N ] corresponding to P [N ], as defined in Section 5.1. The
following proposition is central in graphon theory, [6].
Proposition 2. The space (W , d) is complete.
In particular the previous proposition implies that any Cauchy sequence of graphs (thought
as step function graphons) converges in the graphon space. The statement above is formu-
lated in cut norm. In our analysis, we work with the operator norm. We next recall the
relation between cut and operator norm. Given a graphon W and the associated graphon
operator W as by Definition 1, we recall that for any p, q ≥ 1 it holds
|||W|||p,q := sup
f∈Lp,‖f‖p=1
‖Wf‖q. (C.1)
Lemma 12 ([57]). For any W such that |W | ≤ 1 and all p, q ∈ [1,∞]
‖W‖ ≤ |||W|||p,q ≤
√
2(4‖W‖)min(1−1/p,1/q).
In particular, for p = q = 2 we get
‖W‖ ≤ |||W||| ≤
√
8‖W‖.
The previous lemma is an immediate consequence of [6, Lemma 8.11] and [57, Eq. (4.4),
Lemma E.6] (note that therein ‖W‖ is denoted by ‖W‖,1).
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C.2. Limit of a sequence of network games
Consider a sequence of network games with graphs P [N ] of increasing size N converging
to a graphon W in cut norm as defined in Appendix C.1. We next show that, under suitable
assumptions, the step function equilibria of the network games with graphs P [N ] “converge”
to the equilibrium of the graphon game with graphon W . In other words, the graphon game
with graphon W accurately represents limiting strategic behavior in large networks. Note
that the cut norm is defined up to node relabeling. Consequently, when comparing equilibria
in the L2([0, 1];Rn) domain we use the following
dΠ(f, g) := inf
φ∈Π[0,1]
‖fφ − g‖L2;Rn , (C.2)
for any f, g ∈ L2([0, 1];Rn), where we define fφ(x) := f(φ(x)). Note that (C.2) is consistent
with the definition of cut metric d(W,V ) given in Appendix C.1.
We start with an auxiliary lemma that connects convergence in cut and operator norm.
Lemma 13. Consider a sequence of graphons {W [N ]}∞N=1 and suppose that there exists a
graphon W such that d(W
[N ],W )→ 0. Then there exist {φ[N ] ∈ Π[0,1]}∞N=1 such that∣∣∣∣∣∣(W[N ])φ[N ] −W∣∣∣∣∣∣→ 0.
Proof:. By definition for any ε > 0 there exists N¯ε such that d(W
[N ],W ) ≤ ε for any
N ≥ N¯ε. Moreover, d(W [N ],W ) = infφ∈Π[0,1] ‖(W [N ])φ −W‖ implies that for any N there
exists φ[N ] ∈ Π[0,1] such that ‖(W [N ])φ[N ] −W‖ ≤ d(W [N ],W ) + 1N . Consequently, for any
N > max{N¯ ε
2
, 2
ε
} it holds
‖(W [N ])φ[N ] −W‖ ≤ d(W [N ],W ) + 1
N
≤ ε
2
+
ε
2
= ε.
Therefore, ‖(W [N ])φ[N ] −W‖ → 0. The conclusion follows by the relation between cut and
operator norm (see Lemma 12 in Appendix C). 
By using Lemma 13 we can prove the following convergence result.
Theorem 9. Consider a sequence of network games G [N ]({S}Ni=1, U, P [N ]) where each player
has payoff function U and homogeneous strategy set S i = S for all N ∈ N and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Suppose that there exists a graphon W such that d(P
[N ],W )→ 0 and that the graphon game
G(S, U,W ) satisfies Assumptions 1, 2B) and 3, where S is the set valued function constantly
equal to S. Let s¯[N ] be any step function equilibrium of G [N ] and let s¯ be the unique equilibrium
of G. Then
dΠ(s¯[N ], s¯)→ 0.
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Proof:. For each N , let W [N ] be the step function graphon corresponding to P [N ], so that
by assumption d(W
[N ],W ) → 0. By Lemma 13, there exist φ[N ] ∈ Π[0,1] such that∣∣∣∣∣∣(W[N ])φ[N ] −W∣∣∣∣∣∣ → 0. We showed in Theorem 4 that there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the equilibria of the network game G [N ] and the equilibria of the graphon
game G(S, U,W [N ]). Moreover, it is immediate to show that s¯[N ](x) is a Nash equilibrium
of G(S, U,W [N ]) if and only if s¯[N ](φ[N ](x)) is a Nash equilibrium of the graphon game
G(S, U, (W [N ])φ[N ]) with permuted graphon (W [N ])φ[N ] (this operation indeed is just a node
relabeling). Theorem 3 yields
dΠ(s¯[N ], s¯) = inf
φ∈Π[0,1]
‖s¯[N ](φ(·))− s¯(·)‖L2;Rn ≤ ‖s¯[N ](φ[N ](·))− s¯(·)‖L2;Rn
≤ `U/αUsmax
1− `U/αUλmax(W)
∣∣∣∣∣∣(W[N ])φ[N ] −W∣∣∣∣∣∣→ 0.

C.3. Extension to graphons that are not Lipschitz
Our main result on distance between Nash equilibria in graphon and sampled network
games (see Theorem 5) is derived under Assumption 4. We next show that a similar, but
weaker result can be obtained without such assumption.
Theorem 10. Consider a graphon game G(S, U,W ) where each player has payoff function
U as in (4) and homogeneous strategy set, i.e. S(x) = S for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that
G satisfies Assumptions 1, 2B), 3 and let s¯ be its unique Nash equilibrium. Then for any
population size N ∈ N, with probability at least 1− exp(−N/(2 log2N)) it holds
dΠ(s¯
[N ]
w/s, s¯) ≤ 14K˜
(
1
(log2N)
1
4
)
,
where s¯
[N ]
w/s is any step function equilibrium of the sampled network game G [N ]({S}Ni=1, U, P [N ]w/s)
and K˜ = `U/αUsmax
1−`U/αUλmax(W) is as in (7). Consequently, dΠ(s¯
[N ]
w/s, s¯) → 0 almost surely when
N →∞.
Remark 5. With respect to Theorem 5 there are two main differences. 1) The result in The-
orem 10 holds for dΠ(s¯
[N ]
w/s, s¯) instead of ‖s¯[N ]w/s − s¯‖L2;Rn, that is, we need to accomodate for
node relabeling. 2) The confidence level in Theorem 10 is fixed to δN = exp(−N/(2 log2N))
(converging to 0 as N → ∞). This choice of δN satisfies the constraints required by Theo-
rem 5, therein however other possibilities are allowed (See Remark 3). The reason why both
of these restrictions arise is that, in the absence of Lipschitz continuity, we need to rely on
[6, Lemma 10.16] to bound the “distance” between W and W
[N ]
w/s.
56
Proof:. Let W
[N ]
w and W
[N ]
s be the step function graphons corresponding to P
[N ]
w and P
[N ]
s ,
respectively. Then by [6, Lemma 10.16] with probability at least 1− exp(−N/(2 log2N)) it
holds
d(W,W
[N ]
w ) ≤
20√
log2N
, d(W,W
[N ]
s ) ≤
22√
log2N
.
By definition d(W,W
[N ]
w/s) = infφ∈Π[0,1] ‖(W [N ]w/s)φ−W‖, hence there exists φ[N ] ∈ Π[0,1] such
that ‖(W [N ]w/s)φ[N ] −W‖ ≤ d(W,W [N ]w/s) + 1√log2 N . Consequently, with probability at least
1− exp(− N
(2 log2 N)
) it holds
‖(W [N ]w/s)φ[N ] −W‖ ≤
23√
log2N
.
As a consequence,
dΠ(s¯
[N ]
w/s, s¯) ≤ ‖s¯[N ]w/s(φ[N ](·))− s¯(·)‖L2;Rn ≤ K˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(W[N ]w/s)φ[N ] −W∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ K˜
√
8‖(W [N ]w/s)φ[N ] −W‖ ≤ K˜
√
8 · 23√
log2N
<
14K˜
(log2N)
1
4
=:
K
(log2N)
1
4
(C.3)
where the first inequality follows from the definition of dΠ, the second inequality follows by
Theorem 3, the third inequality follows from Lemma 12 and we set K := 14K˜. To prove
almost sure convergence, similarly as in Theorem 5, let us define the infinite sequence of
events
EN :=
{
dΠ(s¯
[N ]
w/s, s¯) >
K
(log2N)
1
4
}
.
From (C.3) it follows that
Pr [EN ] < exp(−N/(2 log2N)) and
∑∞
N=1 Pr [EN ] <
∑∞
N=1 exp(− N2 log2N ) <∞.
By Borel-Cantelli lemma there exists a positive integer N¯ such that for all N ≥ N¯ , the
complement of EN , i.e., dΠ(s¯[N ]w/s, s¯) ≤ K(log2N) 14 , holds almost surely. Since
K
(log2N)
1
4
→ 0 we
obtain dΠ(s¯
[N ]
w/s, s¯)→ 0 almost surely.

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